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ABSTRACT 
In the past, cybersecurity professionals relied upon Security Event and 
Information Management systems to ingest network, server, and host logs to assist in 
detecting suspicious and malicious activity in the network. Detecting threat activities 
also included manually inspecting packet captures to glean clues of nefarious activity. 
Our research involves machine learning. We developed a model that observes 
the packet headers’ characteristics when a user accessed a remote file server. Data sets 
were introduced and host-server configurations were used to determine if 
our classification model was consistent in identifying file access behavior. We were 
able to predict and classify file access behavior, such as uploading, downloading, 
deleting, and moving files on a file server, based upon using headers. The results from 
deriving the classifications were similar when using different host-server configurations 
and files. 
Our research demonstrated potential avenues to study file access behavior on an 
enterprise network. Information repositories like file servers, SharePoint, and online data 
hosting sites such as Dropbox present a surface threat for information theft. 
Classifying file access behavior with these online resources presents a valuable goal for 
cybersecurity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many large-scale organizations enjoy an enterprise network’s benefits that allow 
for data collaboration, storage, and processing. These networks are often geographically 
separated where a user in Miami, Florida, will need to access a file server based in Los 
Angeles, California. People in these organizations may not be familiar with others who 
work remotely, fostering insider threat activity on the network. These organizations look 
towards cybersecurity professionals to prevent, detect, and react to such threats. 
Cybersecurity professionals are heavily relied upon to set up network sensors, enable 
auditing logs, and monitor intrusion detection systems to detect hackers from the outside 
the network and those on the inside who pose a significant threat to the organization.  
In 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a paper 
that found  82% of their employers in eight countries did not have sufficient cybersecurity 
personnel to defend their organization’s network (Crumpler & Lewis, 2019). CSIS also 
determined that 71% of the employers said that cybersecurity professionals' shortage 
directly and negatively impacted the organization (Crumpler & Lewis, 2019). 
Cybersecurity professionals are in high demand and low supply. These network 
defenders have the heavy task of managing an enterprise. Security information and event 
management (SIEM) applications such as Splunk only present these professionals with 
known data trends. The data trends only show what has happened previously. This leaves 
the defenders to react more to cybersecurity events than on the proactive approach to 
preventing cyber-related events from occurring. These professionals rely on many different 
data types and can be overwhelming when finding clues to who and what is occurring. 
The enterprise network can send and receive many different data formats such as 
full-motion video, email, chat, word documents, and voice of internet protocol. 
Cybersecurity professionals must understand everything that is happening on the network 
to determine if it is experiencing malicious activity or not. Therefore, these cybersecurity 
professionals spend most of their time digging and sifting through network traffic to come 
up with answers to what is happening. 
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Network traffic is a compilation of encapsulated data that contains valuable 
information such as the payload and window size, the transport control protocol length, 
and network time, which is essential for encryption and authentication methods. 
Additionally, network traffic carries data from host to server and vice versa. The traffic can 
contain data about files, usernames, passwords, and commands given for File Transport 
Protocol and Telnet applications.  
Network traffic can also provide clues to what a malicious user may do based on 
network patterns and highlighting statistical anomalies. The problem with identifying 
malicious user behavior is that most organizations use reactive methods. The reactive 
nature gives the malicious user enough time to further expand in the network, establish 
backdoors, install malware, and exfiltrate sensitive data and files before being caught or 
raising awareness to the network defenders. This is important because it leaves private 
industries, government agencies, and military organizations constant threat of their 
network and information systems being vulnerable—our drive to complete this research 
successfully by enhancing cybersecurity professionals using machine learning 
A. MOTIVATION 
1. Major Raymond Blockmon, U.S. Army 
While assigned to the U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade, we understood the need 
for statistical anomaly detection to assist the Cyber Protection Teams (CPT) to hunt and 
disrupt adversary activity on neutral and friendly networks. This may not sound labor-
intensive or complicated, but it is very much so.  
A few years ago, during a training exercise event, I led a small team of cyber 
operators defending a network during an exercise event. Our training environment 
consisted of several file and domain controller servers and fictitious user accounts. The red 
team, which signifies as the adversary, already had backdoors and other avenues of 
approach to re-enter the network established if we used a method that prevented them from 
doing so. The actions conducted by the adversary were overwhelming when considering 
that I had tasked the team members with individual roles and responsibilities like 
monitoring a network, server, and host logs, managing group policy, and implementing 
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firewall rules. Of course, no good plan survives the first contact with the enemy. We 
experienced numerous denial-of-service events and tampering of user accounts.   
What became glaringly obvious was that our method to understand and predict the 
adversary would be futile because we attempted to do this manually. This consequently 
caused workforce to be pulled away from other critical tasks. We were relying on trying to 
catch the adversary. The adversary was continuously exploiting the capability gap I faced. 
The adversary kept my team on the ropes by distracting us and moving our attention away 
from their activity, while the adversary’s real objective was to move sensitive files off to a 
rogue file server quietly.  
I realized that there must be a better and more efficient way to defend the network, 
using the system and network data. Locard’s principle1 is most prevalent in cyber: every 
action committed by an individual, whether a legitimate or a malicious user, will have their 
presence recorded through the system and other appliances that record traffic. It is nearly 
impossible to infiltrate a network without leaving a clean trace behind.  
After my time at the Cyber Protection Brigade ended, I wanted to give back to the 
Army something that can be used in the future and increase its capability to defend 
networks more vigorously and efficiently. This has led me to exploit the incredible 
capabilities that machine learning has to offer.   
2. Lieutenant Natasha Niemann, U.S. Navy 
I have always been interested in Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) since I was in 
college; this led me to pursue my degree in Information Systems Management. During my 
time with Commander Sixth Fleet’s Staff in Italy, I was assigned as a DCO planner for the 
N6 directorate. I felt that many of the network defending strategies that were available for 
scenario planning to use in exercises were not efficient and that we had to rely on our CPTs. 
They do their job well but being overseas made things a bit complicated. As MAJ 
Blockmon mentioned, “that our method to understand and predict what the adversary was 
 
1 Dr. Edmond Locard (1877-1966), a pioneer in forensic science, said that every contact left by an 
individual leaves a trace of their presence behind. For example, holding a glass cup will leave traces of 
fingerprints and DNA from sweat on the glass. 
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going to do was futile.” I have also thought the same thing during my time in the military, 
with different network threats happening around my operations. We must keep our 
networks safe, and our project allows us to explore a capability gap within the Department 
of Defense (DOD).  
B. TRADITIONAL VERSUS MACHINE LEARNING 
One of the many tools that cybersecurity professionals use is the security 
information and event management (SIEM). The SIEM ingests logs to develop trends from 
the network. These professionals also use native tools such as Microsoft PowerShell, 
Security Onion, and other tools to assist with threat hunting. Consequently enough, most 
of these tools are more reactive than proactive. Cybersecurity professionals must monitor 
and analyze network and system activity to identify potentially malicious activity and then 
further expand into an area that appears to be suspicious.  
Using static analysis (where a cybersecurity analysis is sifting through network and 
system logs using SIEM or other means after the malicious or suspicious event occurred), 
the network traffic can help determine the file access behavior by analyzing the headers in 
the network packet. We can automate this process using Python to speed the analysis and 
inspect the network packet headers quickly.  
This research focuses on finding ways to improve network security by identifying 
activities and behaviors of insider threats in the DOD through machine learning (ML). We 
established a test network to provide a baseline of regular user traffic. We then introduced 
simulated malicious traffic of user activity on the network. Subsequently, we compare the 
efficacy and suitability of various ML algorithms to see which yields the best results at 
identifying the malicious behavior from regular baseline traffic. Using ML and operational 
data, this research will draw upon a new technology that can address a capability gap, 
achieve proactive defense, and use an ML model to predict insider threat activities.  
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C. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
Our research's scope includes developing an environment using Python to generate 
and analyze network traffic without external factors influencing the behavior. Doing so 
allowed us to classify and predict file access behavior by using the network traffic. This 
environment will enable us to use deductive reasoning without additional, unwanted 
influences that may change the network behavior.  
The data will assist in generating the network traffic consisting of various files, 
types, and sizes. This provides us with a variety of work patterns to analyze the network 
traffic. Extracting the data from the network traffic allowed us to introduce it to our model, 
which allowed us to classify and predict the type of file access behavior that occurred. 
This research’s primary objective is to identify endangered machines by predicting 
user behavior through SMB operations analyzing network traffic with machine-learning 
algorithms. Our demonstrated approach may provide a low-cost solution to discover insider 
threats within a network.  
Additionally, our research aims to assist cybersecurity professionals at an enterprise 
level with predicting malicious activity is more strenuous and difficult to achieve. This 
capability is a low-cost, high pay-off solution that can improve as more data becomes 
available to a machine-learning model. To classify file access behavior on a file server and 
identify if an insider threat who may want to steal, hide, or delete critical files, we must 
answer two questions: 
Research Question 1: Can we determine unique classifications for each file access 
behavior using packet header data with machine learning? 
Research Question 2: If we use the same machine learning model in two different 
client-server configurations using two different data sets, will the regression model 
determine similar classification characteristics?  
D.  THESIS STRUCTURE 
In Chapter I, we provided a general overview of how cybersecurity is currently is 
practiced in the operational environment through static analysis and SIEMs. These types 
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of methods are painstakingly slow and intense on resource consumption. The capability 
gap needed to expedite rapid and effective cybersecurity response is with machine learning. 
In Chapter II, we researched different machine learning methods with different data 
sets on how to classify malicious and benign activity. We studied the literature review by 
observing several research teams on their approach and using machine learning to increase 
cybersecurity effectiveness. For example, how to classify user and system behavior based 
on keystroke and mouse patterns, application use and preference, and system processes 
behavior such as hard drive speed and memory utilization.  
In Chapter III, we set up our lab using hardware and Microsoft products to establish 
our research environment. We then developed in-house software solutions by using Python 
to program and automate network traffic. We established the ground truth on accessing a 
file server by creating logs. 
In Chapter IV, we then subjected our results from the data by extracting the network 
packets captured in Chapter III. We classified the results with our machine learning model. 
Our team identified the independent variables such as Packet Length and Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP)Length. We derived our target features (dependent variables) such 
as Read, Write, Close, and Create. The results provided us with the classifications based 
on user file access behavior. 
Finally, in Chapter V, we review our research findings, and we offered 
recommendations to continue research at an enterprise level and identified limitations with 
our research in Chapter V.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A critical task in cyber defense is to identify and prevent insider threats from 
occurring. Depending on the network’s size, the system logs must be sifted through by 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems. A SIEM is an enterprise 
application that ingests system logs from servers and network appliances, which then 
generate statistical trends and provide visualization to the data collected. A user can query 
the SIEM in the hopes of identifying anomalous activity that may or may not be apparent 
to the users, such as data exfiltration that leaks slowly to an unauthorized remote server.  
Some organizations use proprietary software that supports their cybersecurity 
program. For example, using McAfee for an anti-virus solution and Tanium for a host end-
point solution to inspect for anomalous or malicious activities on the system (Colbaugh & 
Glass, 2011). Regardless of the software available, these systems and networks present a 
significant problem to cyber defenders due to their increased size and complexity within 
organizations. Reacting to cyber threats and attacks inside a network is a daunting task; 
however, the post threat and attack reaction method are outdated as cyber defenders are 
now looking towards Machine Learning (ML) to proactively prevent these threats and 
attacks before they occur (Colbaugh & Glass, 2011).  
A. PROACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE WITH MACHINE LEARNING 
Most network operations centers (NOCs) have introduced a SIEM solution to help 
cyber defenders monitor through logs. These logs are snapshots that record either 
completed or attempted user and system events on the network, such as: logging in or 
failing to log in to the network, using system tools such as Microsoft PowerShell, or 
creating, deleting, and modifying files and folders on systems. For the most part, every 
action is recorded by the network servers. If configured correctly, these event logs are 
stored to be retrieved later for review by administrators and cyber defenders. To date, most 
NOCs use some method to identify and prevent threats, such as implementing an Intrusion 
Prevention/Intrusion Detection System (IPS/IDS) solution (Masduki, Ramli, Saputra & 
Sugiarto, 2015). The IPS/IDS can inspect network traffic in real-time by matching patterns 
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of malicious IP (internet protocol) addresses attempting to access the local network. It can 
match hexadecimal values of files against its library of known malware (i.e., signatures) 
ruleset. If the IPS/IDS does receive an IP address that is known to be malicious based on 
its ruleset, the sensor will alert the administrators through the SIEM. The IPS/IDS may 
prevent the IP address from entering the local area network by dropping the IP packet if 
the sensor can do so (Fraley & Cannady, 2017).  
ML offers a unique capability for cyber defenders because of its ability to process 
large quantities of data and then categorize and label the data based on classification (Fraley 
& Cannady, 2017). ML can detect future insider threats based on behavior patterns before 
the threat is realized (Fraley & Cannady, 2017). Some essential features that ML offers in 
comparison to SIEMs are conducting statistical analysis such as regression modeling that 
displays the relationship between variables, e.g., a graph that plots unknown IP addresses, 
how many times the unknown IP addressed contacted the network. It can also determine 
what intervals a rouge process is associated with an unknown IP address trying to leave 
and go outside of the local area network (LAN). Using the regression model, the unknown 
IP address’s repeated connection attempts may indicate that it belongs to a command-and-
control server, for instance. As this pattern develops, other workstations that experience 
the same network activity behavior even with different unknown IP addresses should 
warrant further investigation.  
A SIEM displays simple statistical data. For instance, a SIEM will display how 
many times an external IP address is connected to the company’s web server or how many 
times a user has failed to log into their account by entering the wrong password (Mayhew, 
Atighetchi, Adler, & Greenstadt, 2015). SIEMs such as ArcSight, MacAfee, and Splunk 
are limited in predictive analysis. By the time a cyber defender searches the SIEM for 
information, the insider threat may have executed their mission, leaving the organization 
in a panic. Some SIEMs are limited in capabilities, and some are not employed to their full 
potential. In either case, this leaves cybersecurity professionals less capable of defending 
their networks (Mayhew et al., 2015). 
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B. PROFILING USER BEHAVIOR BASED ON HUMAN-MACHINE 
INTERACTION 
Researchers at the University of Wisconsin (UW) were able to use ML to determine 
which users were indicative of system misuse or posed an insider threat (Madison, Shavlik, 
Shavlik, and Fahland, 2001). Constructing a testing environment and using their skills on 
a Windows 2000 server, the team was able to engineer a prototype anomaly-detection 
system that generated statistical results based on user actions such as keystrokes and 
network bandwidth usage (Shavlik et al., 2001). Furthermore, the team could determine a 
pattern of behavior mapped to each user on the network. For example, one user may use 
the mouse to navigate through the application window, while another user may use the 
keyboard to switch through different applications (Shavlik et al., 2001). The Shavlik team 
also conducted event log monitoring by capturing key registry locations such as crucial 
system files, login abnormalities, and changes to accounts that were deemed suspicious. 
The research team also incorporated security policies to alert when unauthorized users try 
to access restricted files.  
Shavlik et al. (2001) then developed an algorithm that measured the input from the 
user and baselined activity on mouse movement and keystrokes mapped to their profile. 
When a malicious user accessed a victim host, the team hypothesized that the algorithm 
would detect a change in keyboard and mouse input activity that does not fit within the 
target victim’s behavior profile. This would signal an alert that the ‘owner’ is not operating 
their host (Shavlik et al., 2001). The UW team trained the algorithm to monitor each user 
and capture 50,000 keystrokes equated to two weeks’ worth of activity. The team also 
captured another 50,000 keystrokes from each user to train their algorithm, followed by 
another 30,000 keystrokes to serve as test data. This test data is independent of the training 
data and allows for an unbiased evaluation. The training data validated the algorithm that 
should produce the expected results. The model will then use the test data (Shavlik et al., 
2001). 
The Shavlik et al. (2001) algorithm worked on computing the time taken between 
each keystroke and the amount of time it is held down. Their model then determined that 
if the keystroke time is less than a specified threshold of the user’s profile, then it would 
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be considered the legitimate user who is typing on the host (Shavlik et al., 2001). If more 
keystrokes entered than the window width of keystrokes allowed, an alert would be raised, 
signifying that the user is malicious. Shavlik et al. (2001) saw that they could identify a 
substantial number of intrusions detected by their algorithm. The team defined intrusions 
as user X typing on user Y’s host with a shallow false-positive rate based on their algorithm. 
For example, user Y would open a file called ‘resume.txt’ in the terminal using the Vim 
text editor. User X would simply enter ‘cat resume.txt’ in the terminal to display the 
contents directly to the screen without using Vim, which is much faster and efficient than 
Y’s approach by using fewer keystrokes. This demonstrates two different approaches that 
achieve the same outcome of reading the contents of a file. The Shavlik team conceded that 
even with a low keystroke. The insider threat has the potential to cause significant damage. 
For example, a single line of code in a script can unpack malware and execute on a host 
(Shavlik et al., 2001).  
The next characteristic that users demonstrated in their daily application usage 
habits. For example, a user may come to the office logon to their host. At this point, a user 
may open their email client to read. This may be a standard operating procedure for some 
workforce users (Davidson & Hirsh, 1998). Over time, these habits can establish a user 
profile on the network based on the data. For instance, a user who did not access a sensitive 
file or directory before now appears to do so. This presents a problem because users may 
now have access to information that they are not authorized to have before. 
C. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS WITH PATTERNS OF RAW INPUT  
Davidson and Hirsh (1998) at Rutgers University conducted research using neural 
networks2 on command-line data generated by the user who interacted with the terminal 
(McKinney, 2008). This research profiled how certain users interacted with their Unix host 
and their applications to determine a user profile (McKinney, 2008). Their effort was 
 
2 “An artificial neural network learning algorithm, or neural network, or just neural net, is a 
computational learning system that uses a network of functions to understand and translate a data input of 
one form into a desired output, usually in another form” (DeepAI, n.d.).  
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primarily driven to understand any given user's behavioral patterns over an amount of time 
to develop their pattern of behavior (McKinney, 2008).  
In the Davison and Hirsh (1998) study, users entered over 2,000 command 
instances in their Unix hosts, with 77 distinct commands used. Davidson and Hirsch (1998) 
hypothesized that people tend to repeat daily habits and are repetitious in the workplace. 
They found the command-line histories stored in memory on the user’s hosts showed 
repeated commands. For example, one user may prefer the ‘cat’ command to view a file's 
contents displayed to the terminal directly. In contrast, another user prefers opening the 
same file in a text editor such as Vim. The team observed 77 users within a period of two 
to six months. They collected over 168,000 commands executed on Unix terminals. The 
research population consisted of 70 undergraduate students in the Internet programming 
course, and the remaining seven were graduate students and faculty (Davison & Hirsh, 
1998).  
 The team found a macro-average3 of 8.4% of the commands that were used were 
new and not logged previously. The researchers noted that the micro-average 4of new 
commands consisted of 3.6%, meaning “…the fact that smaller samples had larger numbers 
of unique commands” (Davison & Hirsh, 1998, p.2). Finally, Davison and Hirsh (1998) 
discovered that one out of five commands entered occurred twice by each user. Figure 1 
displays a snippet of a user’s command-line history; the ‘BLANK’ command marks a new 
session started by the same user. The user entered ‘cd’ twice in the command line, which 
is the command to change to a different location on the file system's directory. The user 
also started a new session later and entered ‘emacs’, a text editor similar to Vim. As 
mentioned previously, the user entered the same command twice and as predicted, may use 
the ‘cd’ and ‘emacs’ command in the future.  
 
3 “Macro-averaged results compute statistics separately for each user, and then averages these statistics 
overall users.” (Davidson & Hirsch, 1998, p.2). 
4 “Micro-averaged results compute an average over all data, determining the number of correct 
predictions made across all users divided by the total number of commands for all users combined.” 
(Davidson & Hirsch, 1998, p.2). 
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Figure 1. Snippet of a User’s Command-Line History 
D. PERIPHERAL ENTRY DATA IN SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE 
Researchers in India at the University of Hyderabad conducted a study on observing 
users masquerading or conducting impersonation. The user’s goal was to gain access to 
confidential data or ultimately escalate user privileges on the network while conducting 
themselves as legitimate users (Bhukya, Kommuru, & Negi, 2007).  
The team determined that any user over time would establish predictive actions by 
interacting with their host. In one example, users may prefer to interact with their host 
using the command-line to make changes to their files in the directory, while another user 
prefers using the desktop graphical user interface (GUI) to access their files (Bhukya et al., 
2007). The research team hypothesized that when an individual interacts with a host and 
their behavior does not fit the behavior profile of the owner of the host, it would indicate 
that the user is a masquerader (Bhukya et al., 2007). 
The Bhukya team observed eight different users with their in-house developed GUI 
event collector and discovered that the collector could efficiently detect masquerading 
users. Bhukya et al. (2007) classified a legitimate session of a user as a “positive” 
classification and a masquerade session by an illegitimate user as a “negative” 
classification. The data generated from the “positive” session would be used to develop the 
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One-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Bhukya et al., 2007). SVM is a supervised 
training model in the ML realm that analyzes data for classification and regression (SciKit 
Learn, 2019). Classification in ML is “the process of predicting the class of given data 
points” (Asiri, 2018, p. 2). In SVM, regression provides flexibility in how much acceptable 
error is in a model and then determines the hyperplane to fit that data (Sharp, 2020).  
Bhukya et al. (2007) used legitimate sessions to develop their model's training data 
as their One-class SVM. The illegitimate data that the masquerading user-generated 
became the test data. In the One-class SVM, only one classification determined what 
regular activity looked like, such as a legitimate user and the session they interacted with 
their host. When another classification became available (i.e., a masquerading individual), 
it was compared against the regular activity. The results showed a distinct difference 
between the two classifications by illustrating the outlier (i.e., a masquerader's activity). 
Additionally, the team determined each user would develop a set number of his/her 
sessions as positive data. The remaining sessions of each user were then used to test against 
legitimate users as negative data (Bhukya et al., 2007).  
The Bhukya research team used detection systems that collected the session data 
from the users to develop the behavioral profile. As a result, the team built individual 
behavioral profiles (Bhukya et al., 2007). After training their detection systems with the 
legitimate data, the team was able first to decipher regular activity and then later identify 
malicious activity when illegitimate data was introduced to it (Bhukya et al., 2007). Bhukya 
et al. (2007) used a method in Unix to leverage the ‘acct’ utility, which records users' 
commands in the terminal. Additionally, the team captured Windows Operating System 
(OS) logs to establish profiles. During their study, Bhukya et al. (2007) discovered that 
little research was conducted on observing Unix and the variant flavors of Linux that 
capture the user’s interaction with the GUI desktop environment.  
At the time of their study, Bhukya et al. (2007) observed the number of mouse clicks, 
the mouse movement's coordinates, and the keys pressed during the user’s session. Since there 
was no logging method to collect their GUI events when the team conducted their research, 
they developed a custom logging tool to collect the events in-house (Bhukya et al., 2007). 
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Bhukya et al. (2007) observed the mouse enter and exit data recorded by the number 
of times the pointer entered and exited the application window, the average number of keys 
entered, and the average number of keyboard shortcuts entered. Bhukya et al. (2007) then 
assigned values to the following parameters to develop the standard deviation and the mean 
of each user. Mouse Clicks consisted of left-clicking, right-click, and double-click equaled 
3, mouse entering and exiting an application equaled 2, wheel rotation horizontal and 
vertical movement equaled 2, keys pressed equaled 1, and keyboard shortcuts equaled 1. 
This data was applied to a sliding window5 technique to generate tuples to serve as input 
values into their SVM (Bhukya et al., 2007). 
After capturing the unique data of each user, their session data were split up. For 
example, User D created eight sessions, and four of those are used for training to develop 
a profile as a legitimate user. The other four sessions created the test data as a masquerader. 
(Bhukya et al., 2007). The team discovered that the average hit rate (i.e., detection rate) 
was 94.88% for User D, who acted as a masquerader on another user’s host. In other words, 
out of 100 sessions where User D acted as a masquerader, 94 of those sessions would be 
detected by a cyber defender using the research team’s One-class SVM method. In 
comparison, only 6 out of those 94 sessions would be undetectable by cyber defenders. 
Figure 2 depicts the results for User D in the One-class SVM.  
 
Result of One-class SVM for User-D 
 
Figure 2. One-Class SVM of User D 
 
5 Sliding window algorithm is where the “data analysis is limited to an interval over the entire set of 
collected data, and, periodically, newly produced inputs are appended to the window and older inputs are 
discarded from it as they become less relevant to the analysis” (Bhatotia et al., 2014). 
User Hits (%) False Positive Rates 
(FPR) 
User E 97.24% 2.75% 
User F 95.00% 5.00% 
User G 94.87% 5.12% 
User H 92.42% 7.8% 
Average 94.88% 5.16& 
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Bhukya et al. (2007) then compared the same users using the Two-class SVM 
approach. A Two-class SVM is where two classifications are trained and then compared 
together. Bhukya et al. (2007) trained both the positive and negative sessions from the users 
and then compared them with the One-class SVM method results. The findings showed 
less success in detection, averaging 53.08% compared to the One-class SVM, which 
resulted in 94.88% detecting the masquerader (Bhukya et al., 2007). Figure 3 displays the 
results of User D in the Two-class SVM method. Out of 100 sessions, User D would have 
been detected in 53 of those sessions. This means that User D would be detected if 
masquerading in 57 out of 100 sessions. The high detection rate posed a significant risk to 
cyber defenders because the reality of having a large percentage of not detecting a 
malicious user could lead to devastating results on the network. For example, data theft, 
manipulation, and administrator account would be compromised. The data suggests low 
confidence in detecting the malicious user. 
 
Result of Two-Class SVM for User-D 
User Hits (%) FPR 
User E 56.86% 8.49 
User F 52.48% 0.00% 
User G 60.38% 0.00% 
User H 42.61% 28.87% 
Average 53.08% 9.34% 
Figure 3. Two-Class SVM of User D 
 
Figure 4. ROC Scores for Users A, B, C, & D Detected as Masqueraders 
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The Bhukya team noted that using the Two-class SVM method detected a wide 
range of probability of the ROC curve, with hit rates ranging from 26.64% to 90.51%; thus, 
deeming it inferior to the One-class SVM method because of the inconsistencies. Figure 4 
displays the ROC scores for Users A, B, C, and D. The data displayed range from 26% to 
90% when detecting the masquerading user. Unlike the ROC scores, the One-class SVM 
recorded by users E, F, G, and H scored 90% or higher across the board in detecting the 
masquerader and establishing consistency. The ROC scores of A, B, C, and D were 
sporadic, inconsistent, and would not help cyber defenders detect and prevent insider 
threats. 
Bhukya et al. (2007) concluded that the One-class SVM was better equipped in 
analyzing user behavior and detecting individuals who were masquerading. They noted 
that using the One-class SVM method was efficient in training the model and developing 
the test data to detect users who were masquerading with it. Finally, the team determined 
that analyzing the keyboard and mouse movements on a GUI-based system effectively 
detected users who were masquerading because of the unique activities that each user 
demonstrated. Bhukya et al. (2007) noted that there was no need to train two classes 
because only using the one class approach was sufficient to detect the legitimate user. Any 
profile that falls outside of the behavioral profile is an illegitimate session, indicating the 
user is a masquerader.   
E. CAPTURING SYSTEM PROCESSES WITH CLASSIFICATION USING 
K-MEANS 
Akaninyene Walter Udoeyop submitted his thesis at the University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville, in 2010 with the goal of profiling users’ activity and deriving their behavioral 
profile. Udoeyop approached the study in three phases: data acquisition, leveraging 
unsupervised data cluster analysis and using the KDE method (2010). Udoeyop would then 
use the results from the data to identify abnormal patterns of behavior that may indicate 
insider threat activity. Udoeyop classified the insider threat activity as either 1) a user with 
legitimate access violating security policy (e.g., inserting an unauthorized Universal Serial 
Bus (USB) device into a company-owned computer) or 2) a user violating access control 
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policy through unauthorized access (e.g., accessing someone’s files without their consent 
or knowledge).  
Udoeyop’s research begins with acquiring data that a user-generated when 
interacting with their host. The data consisted of logs from system processes, hardware 
performance, file system manipulation, and network traffic logs (2010). This data was 
analyzed using the K-means (Garbade, 2018) algorithm to “learn” a user’s normal 
behavior.  
Udoeyop’s (2010) thesis observed methods and actions before the insider threat 
could achieve their goal. For example, Udoeyop (2010) provided a possible scenario of an 
insider threat where a user typically displayed a behavior by only working with a given set 
of files and directories congruent with their user behavior profile. The same user observed 
copying files into another directory that was not accessed before. This activity may indicate 
suspicious or malicious activity and may lead the user to violate company policies.  
Udoeyop (2010) classified behavior as abnormal or normal; both abnormal and 
normal behavior can experience threatening and non-threatening activities. Udoeyop 
(2010) informed his test subjects that they were subjected to monitoring with software 
installed and running in the background on their hosts. Udoeyop (2010) conceded that the 
test subjects were notified due to legal and privacy matters and, in doing so, which may 
skew the results of his research. Suppose a user is made aware that they are being monitored 
on the network. In that case, they may not engage in their everyday activities that may 
violate company policy, such as posting personal views about political issues on social 
media or shopping online while on company time.  
The Microsoft .NET framework was used to collect data in Udoeyop’s (2010) 
research. .NET supports a range of functions such as retrieving event logs and can capture 
the state of software processes and hardware performances (Udoeyop, 2010). Udoeyop 
used the .NET framework and the C# programming language to analyze the data that the 
users generated (2010). Udoeyop also collected processes by their identification number. 
These processes show which programs and services were running and what resources that 
they were consuming. Furthermore, when monitored over a given period, these processes 
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can develop a model and observe thread activities (Udoeyop, 2010). Threads are an 
executable sequence of codes associated with the operating system, and a process can 
spawn multiple threads (Udoeyop, 2010).  
Udoeyop’s research also examined and monitored both the central processing unit 
(CPU) and memory usage using the .NET framework (2010). Over time, this monitoring 
capability by .NET would provide Udoeyop a reliable baseline of hardware performance 
as he conducted his research. He also used the IPGlobalProperties in .NET to analyze the 
network traffic generated by the users. For example, .NET can provide which users 
accessed websites or connected to a file transport protocol (FTP) server (Udoeyop, 2010).  
Finally, Udoeyop (2010) analyzed and mapped the file system behaviors to the 
user’s activity profile. For example, the computer stores and organizes files and folders on 
the system. The user and system can create, delete, move, copy, and modify these system 
folders and files. Udoeyop (2010) used the FileSystemWatcher .NET class that includes 
subroutines and other functions to monitor system folder activities and data events. 
Udoeyop (2010) monitored the user’s activities by observing the following: 
File Created, which creates a new file on the host. 
File Changed, which modifies or resaving a file to the host. 
File Renamed, that changes the name of the file on the host.  
File Delete, by removing an existing file from the host.  
The date the file was accessed on, its absolute file path, and the file name were all 
recorded by the users to facilitate the user profile development (Udoeyop, 2010). Udoeyop 
noted that collecting this information over time can develop the user's profile and the host 
(2010).  
 Udoeyop (2010) developed a histogram (Figure 5) that was produced by the Kernel 
Density Estimation6 (KDE), which separated the finite number of subintervals. Deciding to 
choose either the discrete KDE or continuous KDE method, Udoeyop (2010) chose the former 
because continuous KDE requires the probability of calculating a new data point. Even though 
 
6 “The Kernel Density Estimation is a mathematic process of finding an estimate probability density 
function of a random variable. The estimation attempts to infer characteristics of a population, based on a 
finite data set” (DeepAI, n.d.). 
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continuous KDE is more precise than the discrete method, it is more feasible and acceptable to 
utilize the discrete KDE method due to the amount of data accumulated during the research. 
 
Figure 5. Discrete KDE (left) versus Continuous KDE (right) 
 The third phase included using Kernel Density Exploration (KDE) method to 
complete his behavioral analysis of users. The data stored in a structure called Data Grids 
that resides within the .NET framework.  
Udoeyop (2010) performed his behavioral analysis on the users being observed 
based on the following variables that were generated with their hosts:  
• The number of File System Events versus Directory whereas “the number 
of file creations, modifications, and deletions, along with the files that are 
renamed based on the directory” (Udoeyop, 2010, p. 41).  
• Transport Control Protocol (TCP) Connections versus IP addresses 
whereas “the amount of TCP connections established from the local host 
to a remote machine” (Udoeyop, 2010, p. 41).  
• The number of threads versus the parent process, whereas “the number of 
active threads running per process; each process is grouped by a parent 
process” (Udoeyop, 2010, p. 41).  
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• The number of handles versus processes, whereas “the number of active 
handles per process. A handle is a token, typically a pointer that enables a 
program to access a resource, such as a library function” (Udoeyop, 2010, 
p. 41).  
• Hard drive usage, whereas “the ratio of bytes stored on the hard drive vs. 
the total number of bytes on the hard drive” (Udoeyop, 2010, p. 41).  
• File Read Byte per second, whereas “the amount of memory that a read 
operation is performed on per second” (Udoeyop, 2010, p. 41).  
In Figure 6, the data relation between the parent process ID on the x-axis concerning 
the threads generated by the parent process ID on the y-axis is displayed. For clarity, 
Microsoft defines processes and threads as “A process, in the simplest terms, is an 
executing program. One or more threads run in the context of the process. A thread is a 
basic unit to which the operating system allocates processor time. A thread can execute any 
part of the process code, including parts currently being executed by another thread” 
(“Processes and Threads”, 2018).  
In Figure 6, the parent process ID (Identification) 0 (zero), which is the idle system 
process, has spawned up to 70 threads, which can be expected based on the user’s activity. 
Suppose an application that is running on the host has increased inactivity. In that case, the 
process idle will drop in threads due to system resources such as the CPU processor being 
used to support the application. If the user is inactive on the host, the idle system process 
will rise. The idle system process is consuming host resources, which is normal behavior. 
Relating the parent process ID to the insider threat, each user may develop their process ID 
profile using the different applications they use frequently. For example, a user who has 
never used FTP will most likely not generate a process ID for it.  
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Figure 6. Thread Count (x-axis) versus Process ID (y-axis) 
Clusters are data points grouped on a graph related to one another—for example, 
looking at home prices grouped by neighborhoods displayed on a city map. One could 
assume that by looking at the city map, one may identify where the low, middle, and upper-
class neighborhoods based on the range of home values. We can relate this type of data 
visualization to cybersecurity reasonably well; we can observe which processes started and 
how many threads created from those processes. The processes with the most threads 
would have a denser and more populated cluster. Other processes are as much would 
display a dispersed cluster.  
Figure 7, Graph 1 depicts data points clustered together. Udoeyop (2010) selected 
60 processes he were utilized in his experiment and divided the group in half to come up 
with his initial 30 data points (60/2). These randomly selected data points served as his 
initial clusters, in which “K” represents the number of clusters (i.e., K = 30 in the K-means 
clustering algorithm).  
The other 30 data points that were not converted to clusters were then measured 
and assigned to the nearest cluster. Once this process was completed, Udoeyop (2010) then 
measured and clustered the data points again using the mean value of the distance between 
the clusters. This process continued until the clusters no longer changed, which signified 
the convergence of the clusters. Udoeyop (2010) then identified the center of each of the 
30 clusters to determine its centroids. A centroid is defined as either an actual or imaginary 
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point that lies at the center of a cluster (Garbade, 2018). Figure 7 shows the centroids on 
Graph 1 and a heat map in Graph 2 that displays the KDE statistical distribution. In other 
words, the KDE illustrates the density of the data points by using a heat map; the brighter 
the color, such as white, the denser the cluster is.  
 
Figure 7. Centroid Graph   
After developing the user behavior profile, Udoeyop (2010) used a thread bomb 
technique that spawns numerous threads of a system process, such as creating multiple 
instances of Notepad or Internet Explorer. This method draws on additional resources such 
as memory and processing power to run multiple instances of Notepad and Internet 
Explorer; thus, it creates more system process identifiers. Thread bombing (often referred 
to as fork bombing) is a malicious code that causes a denial-of-service (DoS) attack by 
consuming vast amounts of host resources such as memory. This prevents other legitimate 
processes and applications from running and denying or disrupting the user access to the 
system (Varmazyar, n.d.).  
Udoeyop (2010) recorded an average user behavior probability from his user's 
thread usage pool at .631. Udoeyop (2010) then introduced numerous thread bombs to the 
host unbeknownst to the users to create abnormal activity. Udoeyop theorized that the 
thread bomb should create a significant behavior change but only dropped the thread usage 
slightly from .631 to .448. This showed a marginal change in behavior by 30%. Udoeyop 
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(2010) speculated that the thread bomb did not achieve the desired effect because the thread 
bomb only impacted one of the processes; all the other processes were unaffected. 
One of the key findings in Udoeyop research showed that comparing the behavioral 
profile of the IP of a user’s host to sites they visited frequently, or rarely visited, was 
difficult to analyze. This is because of the nature of how the network interface card (NIC) 
functions. Udoeyop (2010) stated that a network card does not know the difference between 
IP addresses and websites associated with it. Furthermore, to analyze the user’s network 
activity's behavior, he analyzed the geographical IP locations, which he conceded was time 
and resource-consuming. The average IP behavioral profile before foreign websites was 
accessed was .353, and the average IP behavioral profile after foreign websites were 
accessed, such as NorthKorea.com, was .349 (Udoeyop, 2010). Figure 8 illustrates the 
difference between normal and abnormal network activity, depicting a difference of only 
1% change in behavior, considering that the typical NIC in today's standard can transmit 
1-Gigabit per second. 
 
Figure 8. Network Behavioral Profile Normal versus Abnormal Activity 
The next analysis conducted was the port behavioral profile that a user would be 
accustomed to accessing. Udoeyop (2010) discovered a significant change in port 
behavioral profile when users accessed foreign ports (see Figure 9). For example, most 
users access websites using port 80 and port 443 (unsecured and secured web browsing 
protocols, respectively); however, it is rare for users to access ports such as port 23, which 
is associated with Telnet. Telnet is an application used to access a host remotely using clear 
text credentials and is not widely used anymore because of the lack of security measures. 
It is used for the initial configuration of network devices. Udoeyop (201) found that the 
average profile was .894 and dropped to .104, equating to an 89% change in profile 
behavior when users connected to a foreign port. It is important to note that this effort only 
Network IP Profile Average Nominal Behavior Probaility 
Before Foreign Website Access .353 
After Foreign Website Access .349 
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considered accessing destination ports and not source ports. Source ports on a host are 
pseudo-randomly generated and allocated from 1024 to 65,535, making it nearly 
impossible to copy.  
 
Figure 9. Port Behavioral Profile Normal versus Abnormal Activity 
The hard drive and the CPU processing profile behavior provided insightful 
information about the abnormal activity. Udoeyop (2010) found that the average processor 
behavior for a given user was .603. After the abnormal activity was introduced, the host 
recorded a significant drop in profile behavior to .258, resembling a 58% change in CPU 
behavior, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 Process Thread Profile Average Nominal Behavior Probability 
Before New Program Utilization 0.603 
After New Program Utilization 0.258 
Figure 10. CPU Behavioral Profile Normal versus Abnormal Activity 
 Furthermore, Udoeyop (2010) also analyzed the behavioral profile's hard drive 
characteristics and found shocking results, illustrated in Figure 11. Udoeyop (2010) 
conducted two hard drive tests. The first test analyzed and determined average hard drive 
behavioral profile and then added 10 gigabytes (GB) of data to simulate abnormal behavior. 
Udoeyop (2010) found that the average behavioral profile during the baseline test 
introduced a score of .659 probability rate. Injecting 10GB of data dropped the average 
standard behavioral profile to .145, a 78% change in hard drive behavior (Udoeyop, 2010).  
Network Port Profile Average Nominal Behavior 
Probability 
Before Access to Different Ports 0.894 
After Access to Different Ports 0.104 
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Udoeyop (2010) introduced and removed 1GB, 5GB, and 15GB of data onto the 
user’s hard drives as a second test. Udoeyop (2010) observed that the results were similar 
to the first hard drive test, where the probability score of normal behavior dropped 
significantly. Each user having scored a .993 standard behavior profile, and after adding 
1GB, the probability score dropped to .013, equating to a 99% change in hard drive 
behavior. Then, adding 5GB dropped to 0.00, and 15GB also dropped to 0.00, virtually a 
100% change for both 5GB and 15GB behavior change. Udoeyop (2010) recorded that 
users generally added about 1-megabyte (MB) worth of data daily, so an addition of 1GB 
was significantly larger; thus, escaped the average standard behavior profile that one might 
predict. 
 
Hard Drive Profile Average Nominal Behavior 
Probability 
Before Adding 1 GB 0.993 
After Adding 1 GB 0.013 
 
Processor Profile Average Nominal Behavior 
Probability 
Before Increased Workload 0.659 
After Increased Workload 0.145 
 
Figure 11. Hard Drive Behavior Profile Normal versus Abnormal Activity 
Udoeyop (2010) finally concluded that every test dropped the probability rate of 
profile behavior as theorized. It is important to note that the ports and hard drive profile 
behaviors displayed the most change in the behavior profile during Udoeyop’s research 
(2010).  
Hard Drive Profile Average Nominal Behavior 
Probability 
Before Adding 5 GB 0.993 
After Adding 5 GB 0.000 
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F. ANALYZING MALWARE WITH CUCKOO SANDBOX AND LEARNING 
WITH WEKA   
Arshi Dhammi and Maninder Singh, a research team at Thapar University in India, 
tackled the problem of proactively identifying malware based on static and dynamic 
analysis using the Cuckoo sandbox (2015). Dhammi and Singh (2015) approached the 
problem by using ML from the data that was generated from Cuckoo. The Cuckoo Sandbox 
is equipped with native applications built inside of it and open-source tools such as 
Wireshark, Process Explorer, and Regshot, which allow the user to observe what is 
occurring. For example, observing application programming interfaces (API) and binary 
strings that executed with the associated malware (Dhammi & Singh, 2015).  
Dhammi and Singh (2015) collected 1,270 malware and benign files from online 
resources to serve as samples in their ML environment. The team also retrieved benign 
data from a clean Microsoft Windows 8.1 64-bit version after a fresh install (Dhammi & 
Singh, 2015). Furthermore, the clean Windows installation data includes formats such as 
Portable Executables, HyperText Markup Language (HTML) files, executables, 
compressed files, and much more (Dhammi & Singh, 2015). The output presented by 
Cuckoo can be delivered in multiple formats such as HTML, JSON, and MongoDB 
(Dhammi & Singh, 2015).  
Dhammi and Singh (2015) defined static analysis of malware by observing the 
software without running it. This is accomplished by unpacking malware to view the source 
code and investigate how it functions when it executes. Dhammi and Singh (2015) 
leveraged a method developed by researchers at the University of Ballarat, Australia. The 
researchers in Australia developed a system that unpacks malware and automatically 
dissect, observe, and compare benign code against it.  
Dhammi and Singh (2015) approached their research using six steps to determine 
malware activity:  
1. Collect benign and malicious data.  
2. Audit behavior activity.  
3. Generate reports. 
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4. Process data from the reports. 
5. Develop classification and learning using WEKA (Waikato Environment 
for Knowledge Analysis), an open-source machine learning and data 
mining platform. 
6. Conduct validation of the results and verification. 
The team then processed the data produced by Cuckoo in a Comma Separated 
Value (CSV) file (Dhammi & Singh, 2015). The team then converted the CSV file to an 
Attribute Relation File Format (ARFF), an acceptable format that the WEKA platform can 
ingest and conduct ML analysis. The ARFF was then fed into WEKA, which implemented 
a 10-fold cross-validation technique that can be used to conduct data mining tasks, which 
is illustrated in Figure 13. 
Table 1. Classification Results before Feature Selection 
 
 
 The classification consists of five columns (True Positive Rate, False Positive 
Rate, Precision, Recall, and Accuracy7) and five rows (Logistic Model Trees, Naïve Bayes, 
Support Vector Machine, Ridor, and K-nearest neighbors) (Dhammi & Singh, 2015). The 
research team noted that malware signatures such as SHA1 and MD5 hash (i.e., signature) 
algorithms were the least productive in their analysis. Though Dhammi and Singh did not 
 
7 The definitions for True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, Precision, Recall, and Accuracy can 
found in Chapter IV, Figures 30 through 33.  
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explicitly state this in their research, any file can generate a new hash value by simply 
adding a commented-out period (.) or any other character in the source code.  
The team highlighted that file types such as registry keys, resource names, and IP 
addresses ranked higher in priority concerning their analysis (Dhammi & Singh, 2015). 
Changing the attributes in these file types can disrupt the operating system and someone is 
attempting to change the system's functionality, which serves as an indicator of 
compromise. Dhammi and Singh (2015) discovered that the Logistic Model Trees was the 
most accurate at identifying malware at 98% because it demonstrated the ability to classify 
benign files and malware with a 7.7% false-positive rate (FPR). The low FPR equates to 
having cyber defenders spending less time determining if a file is malicious or not. This 
means when cyber defenders identify malware, they have a 98% chance of confirmation 
that it is malware that they were investigating. The team also observed that the recall, true 
positives, and precision were 98.3%, as shown in Table 2. The K-nearest neighbor classifier 
with accuracy was rated the lowest at 81.6% (Dhammi & Singh, 2015).  
Table 2. Classification Results after Feature Selection 
 
 
The clustering results of the unsupervised data, such as IP and file types that the 
team analyzed, found that 53% were portable executable files, followed by PDFs and zip 
files commonly shared and created by users. This may indicate a significant surface threat 
to the network (Dhammi & Singh, 2015). An important aspect to note is that 18% of the 
malware files analyzed had an IP address associated with them. This indicates enabling a 
network connection to an unauthorized server that may reside outside of the private 
network for an adversary to gain access through (Dhammi & Singh, 2015).     
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Dhammi and Singh (2015) concluded their research by indicating that the Simple 
K-means clustering algorithm provided optimal results in differentiating malware in 
different classes. Furthermore, Dhammi and Singh (2015) foresee that even zero-day 
attacks may be easily detected than previously when applying more than one ML algorithm 
to the system behavior.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Observing the different methods such as studying the threads being created or the 
preference of one user using GUI applications instead of the Command Line Interface 
(CLI) terminal, user behavior can determine malicious activity with the appropriate 
machine language. Additionally, the most critical aspect of this thesis is to research the 
most appropriate data available to conduct analysis with and identify the insider threat. 
Furthermore, extreme care will be used to safeguard user data such that it does not infringe 
on personal privacy or violate organizational policy.  
After studying the previous researchers’ methods of identifying the insider threat, 
our contribution would be to spotlight user behavior accessing a file system. The previous 
studies focused on system performances, malware signatures, and user input behavior, but 
none addressed file access types. In our research, we will home in on developing and 
identification classification types based on file access. For instance, understanding 
uploading, downloading, lateral copying, and deleting files allows cybersecurity 
professionals to classify such activities through the data generated on the network. In recent 
years, the DOD continues to be targeted with data theft. According to Jed Pressgrove 
(2020), a contributor for Military.com, said:  
Last year was notable for the number of data breaches, according to multiple 
sources. Earlier this month, company Risk Based Security stated that 15.1 
billion records were reportedly exposed by breaches in 2019, a 284 percent 
jump from 2018. A report from nonprofit Identity Theft Resource Center 
estimates that the U.S. government and military experienced 83 data 
breaches in 2019, which accounted for 5.6 percent of the year's total 
breaches and resulted in the exposure of 3.6 million sensitive records. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This chapter explains the overall design of the experimentation that was conducted. 
The design process consists of three phases. In Phase 1, we prepared a test network with 
dummy files that mimic a business-like environment to analyze traffic. The results will shape 
the following phase. In Phase 2, we have created a test network to generate both normal and 
malicious traffic that uses ML models to classify each. We then analyze the ML model's ability 
to identify user and device actions on the test network. These metrics will be used to measure 
the effectiveness of the model to detect abnormal user behaviors on a network. Finally, in Phase 
3, we conduct our model validation using regression in order to determine the type of 
classification based on file access behavior on the SMB file server.  
Figure 12 shows how the experiment was designed and generated, along with how 
we evaluated the network traffic. This is what we considered as our matured 
implementation, which will be discussed later in this chapter.   
 
Figure 12.  Overall Matured Experimental Design Flowchart 
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A. PHASE 1: CREATION OF THE TESTING ENVIRONMENT  
We start with Phase 1, which is where the test network was designed for traffic analysis. 
This test network includes dummy files to mimic normal network traffic and data usage. The 
network designed to support the experimentation consist of the following devices:   
1. 1x NetGear ProSafe GS108 Gigabit Switch 
2. 4x Category 5e Cables (5 feet each) 
3. 2x Raspberry Pi (Generation 1), 32GB SD Cards 
4. 1x Intel NUC (NUC10FNK) 
5. 1x Dell Precision 7720 Laptop 
6. 1x Linksys EA7500 Route 
  
Figure 13. Logical Network Diagram of Experimental Environment 
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Figure 14.  Actual Experimental Equipment Used 
1. Network Configuration 
The Raspberry Pis and the Intel NUCs (both referred to as end devices hereinafter) 
were connected to the NetGear switch with the Category 5e cables. Figure 15 shows the IP 
addresses for the associated devices in this experiment: 
 
Host IP Address 
Windows 2019 Server 192.168.1.50 
Windows 10 192.168.1.51 
Raspberry Pi (Rasp1) 
Attached to Windows 2019 Server 
192.168.1.61 
Raspberry Pi (Rasp2) 
Attached to Windows 10 
192.168.1.62 
Figure 15. Host and IP Diagram 
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To access and manage the network environment remotely, the NoMachine8 
application was used to serve as a remote desktop application. We then configured the 
router to use single port forwarding to allow external access to the internal local area 
network (LAN) of our experimental network environment.  
The IP addresses were statically rather than dynamically assigned to ensure that the 
packet source and destination remained consistent. One NUC had Windows 2019 Server 
installed on it and the other NUC had Windows 10. Both NUCs did not receive any patches. 
See Annex 3 for a complete list of software installed. 
The primary application that was used and installed on the Raspberry Pis for this 
experiment was Samba. The Raspberry Pis were configured to serve as the SMB servers 
and were configured with SMB version 2 (SMB2). The NUCs connect to the SMB servers 
by mapping to their SMB share file location. In Windows Explorer, you can view the SMB 
share drive attached to the NUC9 in Figure 16. Natively, SMB2 does not implement 
encryption by default. To enable encryption, the configuration in the SMB configuration 
file to enable encryption to occur. The encrypted SMB traffic introduces challenges to 
classify SMB actions on the network because it encrypts the SMB commands end-to-end 
on the traffic. Wireshark sniffs the encrypted traffic and cannot identify the SMB 
commands in their encrypted state. This is true for network sensors that are tapped in-line 
with the physical and/or logical connection.  
Our initial attempt to create an environment used the same hardware for both 
Windows 10 and Windows Server 2019. Our initial setup for Windows Server 2019 was 
not compatible with the NUC due to Intel not providing driver support for Windows Server 
2019. This prevented us to configure the NUC to receive network access. We then switched 
the NUC for a Dell Precision 7720 laptop and installed Windows Server 2019. After 
 
8 NoMachine must installed on all machines in order to access them by remote. Information for 
NoMachine can be found at www.nomachine.com. 
9 Operations such as adding and viewing SMB drives are identical on both NUCs; therefore, only one 
screenshot will provide evidence for the sake of brevity. Hereinafter, this will be a common occurrence 
since we conduct similar SMB operations within our networking environment.  
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verifying that SMB file sharing had occurred, we moved onto Phase 2 of the 
experimentation designed with Python (programming language) and Wireshark. 
 
Figure 16. SMB Drive Attached on the NUC  
B. PHASE 2: SMB TRAFFIC GENERATION AND PACKET CAPTURE 
In Phase 2, we were able to record packet captures (PCAP) with SMB traffic from 
the production network. We generated our own SMB network traffic using Python scripts 
that replayed several file access behaviors. This enabled us to conduct analysis of our 
approach and then transition to our mature process that was found to be best suited for 
SMB traffic generation and packet capture. 
1. Early Implementation of SMB Traffic Generation with Python 
Initially, a program was developed that opened and closed random files on the SMB 
servers (Rasp1 and Rasp2). These files are charted below in table one and two.  
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Table 4. Server 2019 and Rasp2 File Types 
 
 
The program would open and close each file in a synchronous order with sleep 
time10 enabled to prevent applications from crashing. As each file opened and then closed 
on the SMB drive, the program would output when the file opened, closed, and the file 
name itself. We introduced the random function in Python to select files randomly in the 
 
10 Sleep time pauses the processes with the Python script for a specified or random amount of time, and 
then will continue operations. This is necessary for other file or system operations to complete prior to the 
Python script to carry on in its operations.  
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folder so that predictability would be minimized when we introduced the output to a .txt 
file to the ML algorithm. This process would continue until all the files have been opened 
and read. Figure 20 depicts a high-level view of the fileopenerrandom.py process. 
We identified issues earlier in our early implementation of the SMB traffic 
generation. One problem that we experienced, was that as a file opened and then closes, 
the processing time-lagged and caused the fileopenerrandom.py to crash. This is due to 
attempts to close the application after its been closed. To address this issue, we 
reconfigured the script to use the try and except function, whereas the try would attempt to 
close out the application that the file opened with. With the except function, we 
implemented the pass feature that continues the process without crashing. Typically, we 
would use the except feature to catch the error; however, in this case, our goal was to 
continue to open files on the SMB share without disruption. 
 
Figure 17. Random File Opener Fileopenerrandom.py Flowchart 
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2. Applying the Wireshark Filter 
Before executing the program, we prepared Wireshark to look for traffic only using 
the following filter: IP Host 192.168.1.51 and IP Host 192 168.1.62 on the Ethernet 
interface (Figure 18). This enabled us to focus on just the network traffic between Rasp2 
and Windows 10 when we executed the fileopenerrandom.py script. It is important to note 
that we chose to use Windows 10 and Rasp2 for our experimentation. Furthermore, the 
same operations conducted on Windows 10 and Rasp2 were executed on Windows Server 
2019 and Rasp1. We recorded epoch timestamps for all scripts (see Figure 22)11.  
 
Figure 18. Wireshark Filter Settings 
One of the limitations of fileopenerrandom.py is that it does not accurately capture 
the SMB commands that were being used initially. For example, a file opened on the SMB 
server but not edited was referred to as “Open”, when in actuality the SMB command is 
“Read”. The output from the Python script created a .txt file. We later changed the output 
to a .csv format to enable effortless ingestion into the ML algorithm. 
 
 
11 Epoch time is recorded in seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, January 1, 1970. 
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Figure 19. Output from fileopenerrandom.py 
After trial-and-error, we matured our network traffic generating script as well as 
our Wireshark packet capture extraction in an effort to further optimize our workflow and 
process.  
3. Matured Implementation of SMB Traffic Generation with Python 
The next iteration of Python scripting captured the SMB commands accurately and 
reflects the commands in Wireshark, including additional information and creating an 
output to a .csv format. We revised our Python traffic generator, SMBGenerator.py, to 
mimic very basic user behavior. We also incorporated the  “Read, Write, Download, 
Upload, and Lateral Copy”.  
For example, random files open and close for random lengths of time from 5 to 15 
minutes.  “Random” .docx and .txt files can be written to at random when selected, but not 
every .docx or .txt document will be written to, and the number of characters that are 
written in the documents is random as well. The  “Download” SMB command is a function 
where a file is downloaded from the Rasp2 to Windows 10 local system. The  “Upload” 
SMB command is the function where a local file on the Windows 10 systems uploads a file 
to Rasp2. Finally,  “Lateral Copy”, is the SMB command where a file from one directory 
on Rasp2 is moved to another directory on Rasp2.  
Figure 20 depicts a high-level view of SMBGernator.py on how it processes basic 
user behavior and generator SMB traffic.  
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Figure 20. SMBGenerator.py High-Level Flowchart 
The output from the SMBGenerator.py captures all the necessary data that we 
require to conduct our regression analysis with ML. Most importantly, was capturing the 
epoch time of when the SMB command was sent by SMBGenerator.py. To do so, we ensure 
that we use the time() function in Python, and return the results to the  “sysTime” identifier 
every time an SMB command is executed. Figure 21 illustrates the SMB operation being 
conducted, one file at a time, one process at a time until all files in the targeted directory 
have been processed. 
 
Figure 21.  Single SMB Operation Flowchart 
Figure 22 displays a sample output from SMBGenerator.py that created a .csv file. 
This file records the following information: 
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Filename: Records the filename used during the SMB process. 
SysTime: The recorded epoch time when the SMB process started. 
FileAction: The SMB command  “Read, Write, Download, Upload or Lateral 
Copy” that was randomly selected to use for the process.. 
FileStatus:  “A” - Last time file was accessed/read.  “M” - Last time file was 
modified.  “C” - Last time metadata was changed on file (Linux), or the 
creation time of the file (Microsoft). 
FileMode: Records the inode (which is the metadata that includes file creation and 
access time, for example) of the file such as  “Read, Write and Access” 
permission groups.  
FileSize: Records the file size in bytes. 
CreateTime: Records the time the file was created from the metadata in epoch time. 
AccessTime: Records the time the file was last accessed in epoch time. 
ModifyTime: Records the time the file was last modified in epoch time. 
 
Figure 22. SMBGenerator.py Sample Output 
The output from SMBGenerator.py serves two purposes; it records every action that 
occurred on the SMB sever; and it is our experimental designs’ ground truth of our 
research. The data that is recorded by SMBGenerator.py uses the local system time in 
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epoch format. We accounted for the network time and other information using Wireshark 
PCAP, which we will discuss next.  
4. Wireshark Packet Capture Output 
Figure 23 illustrates the first few packet captures from Wireshark that were 
generated from network activity by SMBGenerator.py Python script. This will be used to 
facilitate our regression analysis in Chapter 4. The blue arrow indicates that the rows and 
columns continue as a single packet. 
 
Figure 23. Wireshark Packet Capture Sample in CSV Format 
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The following fields were selected to be used for our regression analysis:  
Table 5. Regression Analysis Fields 
 
After exporting the PCAP to a .csv format, it is important to delete everything after 
the last  “Close” SMB command, under the SMB command field in the PCAP .csv file 
before conducting any further analysis. If SMBGenerator.py processes all the files first, the 
script will complete and stop. However, Wireshark will continue to capture packets on the 
network because the client (NUC) will continue to send keep-alive packets to maintain the 
socket connection to the SMB server. This is not desirable because it can dilute the data 
that we are trying to analyze. Figure 24 illustrates the last “Close” SMB command and the 
keep alive packets. As shown in Figure 24, there are multiple  “Close” commands 
associated with the PCAP. We are only interested in the last one because it signifies the 
Field Name Definition 
 
No The number of the packet in the sequence of order that 
was captured, beginning at one (1). 
Time The epoch time recorded at the time of the SMB 
operation occurred on the network. 
Delta Time The change in the time between the last packet capture 
and the current capture. 
Source Source IP address of the end device that originated the 
SMB connection. 
Src Port Source port number that the SMB connection originated 
from. 
Destination The destination IP address to where the SMB connection 
is going. 
Dst Port The destination port that the request is being made to. 
Protocol The protocol that the packet in question is using. 
Packet Len The packet length recorded in bytes. 
TCP Len The TCP length recorded in bytes. 
SMB CMD The SMB command is used in the packet. It is important 
to note, that not every packet will record an SMB 
command. 
Info The condensed field displays some of the data in the 
previous fields in brevity. 
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last file in the target shared folder that has been processed and closed; therefore, we delete 
all the packets after the last “Close” SMB command. 
 
Figure 24. Last Close SMB Command and Keep-Alive Packets 
After the final SMB “Close” command and removing the excess keep alive packets, 
the PCAP .csv file will then be used as the input data for the PcapExtraction.py Python 
script.  
5. Quantifying the Wireshark Packet Capture Data 
To conduct our classification analysis, we had to create a python script that would 
take the data from the packet capture and present them to the regression algorithm. To do 
so, we created the feExtractionSMBcount.py. This program extracts features from a non-
overlapping sliding window which we set to 30 packets. The following independent 
variables were calculated for every window: 
Delta_Time_Mean: Calculated mean for delta time. 
Delta_Time_Std: Calculated standard deviation delta time. 
Window_Size_Mean: Calculated mean for window size. 
Window_Size_Std: Calculated standard deviation for window size. 
Packet_Length_Mean: Calculated mean for packet length. 
Packet_Length_Std: Calculated standard deviation for packet length. 
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TCP_Len_Mean: Calculated mean for TCP length. 
TCP_Len_Std: Calculated standard deviation for TCP length. 
The following SMB commands are calculated using the “Sum” function, which 
tallies the amounts that were called or executed. We are primarily focused on 
understanding the SMB network behavior of the “Create, Read, Write, and Close” SMB 
commands.  
Create: SMB command that is created by the client to access a file or creates a file.  
Read: SMB command that opens a file or folder. 
Write: SMB command that indicates data has been written to file. 
Close: SMB command that closes the file or the SMB session. 
Session_Setup: SMB command that setups the SMB session by the client. 
Session_Logoff: SMB command that logs the client off the SMB server. 
Tree_Connect: SMB command request to mount to the SMB drive. 
GetInfo: SMB command to retrieve the metadata on the selected file. 
Find: SMD command to locate the requested file. 
Create_Ioctl: SMB command for Input/Output System control calls 
No_Op: No operation conducted. 
It is important to note that all though we incorporate other SMB commands, the 
“Read, Write, Close, and Create” are of most interest as these reflect to some extent the 
action a user is performing. Figure 25 illustrates a high-level view of how 
feExtractionSMBcount.py quantifies the PCAP data. Figure 26 represents a sample from 




Figure 25. feExtractionSMBCount.py High-Level Process  
The connecting arrows indicate that it is a continuation of the output. 
Figure 26. feExtractionSMBCount.py Sample Output 
6. Preparing to Test for SMB Behavior Using Machine Learning 
With our experimental network completed, we can move forward with classifying 
SMB network behavior with ML. With the data generated, we will train and then test our 
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model. This will enable us to predict the type of SMB operation that may occur given the 
data that is generated.  
C. PHASE 3: MODEL VALIDATION 
In Phase 2, we analyzed the capability of the ML model to classify malicious versus 
benign traffic in the network. We will now look at metrics and measures of effectiveness 
to determine if the ML model is accurate. 
After extracting the dataset using the feExtractionSMBcount.py script, we split our 
dataset in half; the first half is to train the model and the second half is to test the model. It 
is important to note that the window size is set to 30 which represents the number of 
instances that are being evaluated in the ML at a time. As each window is being processed, 
the sum of each SMB action is calculated as well as the data in the TCP header. For 
example, the labels (independent variables) were identified such as the Window Size, 
Packet Length, and TCP length. The TCP header is calculated to derive the mean and 
standard deviation and the SMB commands are being tallied. 
As each window is being processed, the features (or dependent variables) are being 
calculated to classify and predict the type of SMB command is be taken such as Create, 
Write, Read and, Close.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, we will present our analysis of the classification process. We 
conducted our experiment using SMB operations: the download, upload, lateral copy, and 
delete operations to help classify and predict the type of file access behavior. Additionally, 
our experimentation utilized different file types and sizes, found in Chapter II tables 1 and 
2, and was conducted using two other operating systems to add complexity and depth to 
our model.  
The team conducted the following SMB operations using every file in our target 
directory. Our first SMB operation completed lateral copying of the files from one file 
directory on the SMB server to another location on the same server. Then we downloaded 
all of the files from the SMB server to the client. We followed up by uploading all of the 
files from the client to the SMB server. Lastly, we deleted all the files in our target directory 
on the SMB server.  
A. CLASSIFICATION METRICS  
It is essential to understand the numbers behind the metrics to quantify the SMB 
commands12 that classify file access behavior. The metrics provide us with the accuracy 
and precision data required to explain the SMB prediction and classification in our model. 
This model analyzed the network packets we collected over the associated SMB operation 
with a window size set to 30. With our sliding window set to analyze 30 network packets 
simultaneously, multiple SMB command features were identified and then associated with 
the SMB operation. Our model created a multi-label classification from the data that 
resulted from the sliding windows. The multi-label classifications use the read, write, close, 
and create labels based upon the SMB commands used. Then, the precision, recall, support, 
and the f1-score were associated with the labels to describe their accuracy. Figures 27 
through 33 will illustrate the significance of these values.  
 
12 SMB Commands consisted of Read, Write, Create, and Close. 
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Our model's predictive accuracy depends on understanding the confusion matrix's 
values and their associated SMB commands. We must first understand what True Positive, 
True Negative, False Positive, and False Negatives are. These values will determine the 
Precision and Recall that will help predict the user’s action.  
 
Figure 27.  Confusion Matrix 
True Positive (TP): “Is an outcome where the model correctly predicts 
the positive class” (Google Developers, 2020). 
False Positive (FP): “Is an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts 
the positive class” (Google Developers, 2020). 
False Negative (FN): “Is an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts 
the negative class” (Google Developers, 2020). 
True Negatives (TN): “Is an outcome where the model correctly predicts 
the negative class” (Google Developers, 2020). 
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Figure 28. Recall Formula 
Recall (also known as sensitivity): percentage of correct predictions for the actual 
positives13. Figure 28 illustrates the formula to derive the recall value. 
 
Figure 29. Precision formula 
Precision: percentage value of those examples that are identified as positive was 
confirmed to be true. Figure 29 illustrates the formula for precision. 
 
Figure 30. f1-score 
F1-score: “The F1 score can be interpreted as a weighted average of the precision 
and recall, where an F1 score reaches its best value at 1 and worst score at 
0” (sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.). 
Support: total number of occurrences found in our target features (also known as 
our dependent variables) (“sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.).  
 
13 More information about Recall, Precision, and F1-score can be found at https://www.scikit-
yb.org/en/latest/api/classifier/classification_report.html. 
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Micro-average: “Calculate metrics globally by counting the total true positives, 
false negatives and false positives” (“sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.).  
Macro-average: “Calculate metrics for each label, and find their unweighted mean. 
This does not take label imbalance into account” 
(“sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.).    
Weighted average: “Calculate metrics for each label, and find their average 
weighted by support (the number of true instances for each label). This 
alters ‘macro’ to account for label imbalance; it can result in an F-score that 
is not between precision and recall” (“sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.).   
Sample Average: Calculate metrics for each instance, and find their average” 
(“sklearn.metrics.f1_score”, n.d.). 
With the metrics identified for our classification analysis, we will cover the study 
of SMB operations. It is important to note that we relate these operations to what an insider 
threat may do on a network in terms of file access by moving (or removing) large quantities 
of files around and off the network.  
For example, a malicious user may want to steal all the files on a specific directory 
by downloading all files. A malicious user may also try to move the contents from one 
network directory to another location (i.e., lateral copy). They may want to delete all the 
files in a directory on the network for an arbitrary reason. Malware can also conduct these 
types of actions; therefore, it is essential to classify and understand what uploading, 
downloading, lateral copy, and deleting files look like through ML. We selected all files in 
a target directory and not just individual files or a selected group of files through this 
research. Although these actions do not necessarily disrupt the SMB server, they do present 
the issue of disrupting business operations where critical documents can be stolen, 
corrupted, and removed altogether. 
Finally, Windows 10 used a smaller number of files to conduct SMB operations 
instead of the same files on Windows Server 2019 (Server 2019), which had many files. 
The analysis data will have different ratings in their features, but overall, the classification 
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should be similar when comparing histograms. Windows 10 and Server 2019 used other 
numbers of files and file sizes analyzed with our classification model. We chose this 
method because regardless of the number of files and their size, and the operating system, 
our model, can generalize the classifications of the type of file access behavior.  
B. SMB CLASSIFICATIONS AND RESULTS 
The results from our model are displayed in Figures 34 through 41. The histograms 
are the graphical representations of what our classification model predicted based upon the 
packet captures when SMB operations occurred. The tables associated with the histograms 
are the actual values that our classification model determined, such as the precision, recall, 
and f1-scores. Through the remainder of this chapter, we will refer to the f1-score more 
often because it takes in both and strikes the middle ground between the precision and 
recall scores. Therefore, we selected the f1-score as our metric when weighing the 
relevancy of our classification model's features.   
For clarity, when we discuss SMB commands such as “write,” “read,” “create,” and 
“close,” we are explicitly stating the actual command sent to the SMB server. The SMB 
commands are different than when we discuss the Write, Read, Create, and Close features 
associated with the statistical data that our classification model derived. For example, the 
precision, recall, f1-score, and support values are associated with the features previously 
named. 
Additionally, we defined our classification (Upload, Download, Lateral Copy, and 
Delete) based upon the group of features. For instance, when we reference the Upload 
classification, the values in the features (Create, Read Write, and Close) make up its 
classification. Each classification will have the same set of features, but each feature's 
values will be different for each classification, which gives the unique characteristic of 
each classification. 
Recall Raspberry Pis are functioning as SMB servers. Windows 10 and Server 2019 
are the clients. When we discuss the clients, we are explicitly discussing Windows 10 and 
Server 2019 together, unless otherwise stated. Finally, Windows 10 used 229 files with a 
combined size of 382MB. Server 2019 used 271 files with a total size of 354MB. Having 
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different files is essential because even though both clients have different numbers of files 
and file sizes, the classifications that we defined and the associated features will display 
similar accuracy results.  
1. Upload SMB Operation 
The results from uploading files from Windows 10 to the SMB server are in Figure 
31. The analysis displays the amount of support (or the frequency occurrence of the 
targets). Out of the four SMB features, the Create feature occurred the most with 395 
occurrences, and according to the recall, it carried a score of 95%. Server 2019 performed 
very similarly with the Create feature support of 486 shown in Figure 32.  
In Figure 32, the Write feature recorded the second-highest amount of actual feature 
occurrence with 463.  
A unique characteristic of the Upload classification for Windows 10 and Server 
2019 is that the f1-score and support score for the Read feature was null. The f1-score 
indicated no SMB “read” command during the upload operation as ground truth because 
the user did not access any files on the SMB server. The user placed the files on the SMB 
server instead. According to Figures 31 and 32, both operating systems made very small 
predictions in the SMB “read” commands.  
Overall, both Windows 10 and Server 2019 feature predictions appear nearly 
identical to each other regardless of the files processed in the Upload classification 
regarding the histograms. It is important to remember that Windows 10 and Server 2019 
processed different amounts of files. The visual comparisons of the histograms follow the 
same pattern between one another. One characteristic to note is that the Write feature 
predictions for Windows 10 in Figure 31 are smaller than Server 2019. We assumed that 
the Upload classification's characterization is that the Create feature will be the dominant, 
followed by either the Close or Write as the second feature and the Read feature being a 
non-dominate feature.  
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2. Download SMB Classification 
Windows 10 and Server 2019 SMB Download classification look nearly identical 
according to the histograms in Figures 33 and 34. In terms of ground truth, SMB "read" 
command for Windows 10 and Server 2019 in the SMB Download classification score are 
high. In Figure 33, Windows 10 recorded an f1-score of 97%, and Server 2019’s f1-score 
recorded a score of 99%, shown in Figure 34. The f1-scores indicate that the Read feature 
will be the most prominent in the Download classification regardless of the operating 
system.  
Another clear distinction is that both operating systems recorded nearly no SMB 
“write” commands when downloading files. Windows 10 recorded support of one 
according to Figure 33, and Server 2019 recorded zero support in the Write feature shown 
in Figure 34. We can generalize that the SMB Download classification will consist of little 
to no SMB “write” commands. We can infer the SMB “write” command will have little to 
no presence in support value associated with the SMB Download classification.  
3. Lateral Copy SMB Classification 
Both operating systems reported the same support value for the Write feature when 
they conducted the lateral copy of files on the SMB server. This Write feature closely 
resembles the characteristics of the Write feature found in the SMB Download 
classification.  
In Figure 35, Windows 10 has a much higher f1-score in the Read feature at 91%, 
whereas Server 2019 in Figure 36 reports an f1-score of 83%. The Read feature has a lower 
score on the SMB server than on a client machine because files did not transfer to another 
server/client. 
Overall, both Windows 10 and Server 2019 exhumed higher f1-scores collectively 
than any other classification when we only consider the Create, Read, and Close features. 
The score of the features is a distinct characterization of the lateral copy classification.  
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4. Delete SMB Classification 
Of all the classifications, the SMB Delete classification marked the highest f1-
scores, with Windows 10 having 100% for both Read and Close features shown in Figure 
37. Server 2019 has f1-scores of 97% the Create feature and 95% in the Close feature 
shown in Figure 38.  
Both Windows 10 and Server 2019 recorded the same f1-score with 0% regarding 
the Write feature. Server 2019 recorded an f1-score of 96% in Figure 38 for the Read 
feature. It is unclear why Server 2019 would conduct SMB "read" commands for an SMB 
Delete classification. It may be operating in a server role with different system processes 
that Windows 10 does not have or use that influenced the behavior. It is important to note 
that there have been no additional group policy settings made or any other server 
configurations adjusted other than allowing the SMB server to be logically attached to 
Windows 10 and Server 2019 
5. Overall SMB Feature Model Performance 
The classification model performed very well in its prediction and determined the 
data behind the features associated with the type of SMB operations used. Referencing 
Figures 39 and 40, we relate the success of our classification model's accuracy using the 
f1-score because it represents the harmonic balance between the precision and recall scores 
(i.e., the f1-score is the middle ground between precision and the recall scores). The overall 
results for Windows 10 in Figure 39 and Server 2019 are in Figure 40. 
With Windows and Server 2019 performing SMB operations with different 
quantities of files (Windows 10 having 229 and Server 2019 having 271), both overall 
provided similar f1-scores with their features. For example, with Windows 10, Figure 39 
shows an f1-score of 92% for the Create feature and an f1-score of 94% for the Read 
feature. Similarly, Server 2019 in Figure 40 also recorded the Create feature with an f1-
score of 92% and a Read feature with 92%. The marginal difference between Windows 10 
and Server 2019 Create feature was 0.2% (Windows 10 having 92.4% and Server 2019 has 
92.2%). The 0.2% difference is critical because regardless of the files used, both clients 
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behaved similarly, making the classification model suitable to be used in an enterprise 
environment.  
Additionally, the f1-score for the Write feature was nearly identical in overall 
performance for both clients, which lends credence that this classification model provides 
consistency in predicting and determining the file access behavior.  
Furthermore, Windows 10 and Server 2019’s Read feature had a wider marginal 
difference, but still very close with a 2% gap between the f1-scores. As with observing the 
near-identical performance with the Create feature for Windows 10 and Server 2019, we 
can argue that both systems perform nearly identical concerning the Read feature when we 
analyzed it with our model.  
Windows 10 and Server 2019 also performed similarly to our classification model 
when we observed the Write feature. Windows 10 recorded an 86% f1-score concerning 
the Write feature, while Server 2019 recorded an f1-score of 86%. The marginal difference 
that our model determined between Windows 10 and Server 2019 is 0.3%.  
Finally, our model showed similar results with Windows 10 and Server 2019, 
analyzing the data from the SMB “close” commands. Windows 10 recorded an f1-score of 
89%, shown in Figure 39, while Server 2019 recorded an f1-score of 90%, as shown in 
Figure 40. The marginal difference between Windows 10 and Server 2019 is 1%, which 
indicates that our model performed consistently with both systems.  
Suppose the overall Read, Create, Close, and Write features were inconsistent 
between Windows 10 and Server 2019 by not having similar scores. In that case, our model 
may not support an enterprise environment well enough to predict and determine the type 
of SMB classifications that would occur.  
Considering that both Windows 10 and Server 2019 used different data quantities 
to process their SMB operations, our model predicted accurately and closely resembled 
one another in terms of metrics. Though our classifications can be generalized, the features 
that our model determined displayed similar characteristics to what Windows 10 and 
Server 2019 had.   
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6. Classification Figure Results 
Windows 10 Upload Classification 
 
Figure 31. Windows 10 Massive Upload Chart and Histogram 
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Server 2019 Upload Classification 
 








Windows 10 Download Classification 
 
Figure 33.  Windows 10 Massive Download Chart and Histogram 
61 
Server 2019 Download Classification 
 








Windows 10 Lateral Copy Classification 
 
Figure 35.  Windows 10 Massive Lateral Copy Chart and Histogram 
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Server 2019 Lateral Copy Classification 
 
Figure 36. Server 2019 Massive Lateral Copy Chart and Histogram 
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Windows 10 Delete Classification  
 
Figure 37.  Windows 10 Massive Delete Chart and Histogram 
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Server 2019 Delete Classification 
 








Windows 10 Overall Classification 
 Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
Create 0.923 0.921 0.922 1027 
Read 0.934 0.948 0.941 1411 
Write 0.917 0.824 0.868 255 
Close 0.892 0.888 0.890 937 
Figure 39. Windows 10 Overall SMB Chart 
Server 2019 Overall Classification 
 Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
Create 0.938 0.910 0.924 1621 
Read 0.931 0.915 0.923 1662 
Write 0.930 0.808 0.865 463 
Close 0.896 0.906 0.901 1577 
Figure 40. Server 2019 Overall SMB Chart 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We found that identifying file access behavior may not have been widely 
researched before. Our goal for this research was to determine if we can predict and classify 
file access behavior using the packet headers found in the network traffic. Using ML to 
analyze network packets to classify would enable cybersecurity professionals to be 
proactive in defending the network rather than reactive.  
By researching commercial network traffic generated solutions, experimental 
scripts, and packet carvers, we considered an auto-user process to assist SMB generation. 
Our approach was to use ML and study the network traffic generated by predicting what 
the user was doing.  
A. SIMULATING SMB NETWORK TRAFFIC 
The "Fileopenrandom.py" Python script performed very well when generating 
SMB traffic. However, it did not account for a few factors, such as a user running multiple 
instances of Word or Excel files concurrently. It did not account for writing to different 
files simultaneously or having numerous files opened for prolonged periods. Our model 
might have determined different results if this was the case. For example, the 
Fileopenrandom.py script opened files for a set amount of time; we chose a random time 
between 5 to 15 minutes. In a production environment, documents can be left open for 
hours at a time, and this can cause additional data to be generated in the packet capture, 
potentially skewing results.  
The network environment is straightforward, using the SMB servers, clients, and 
the network switch. In this type of experimental environment, there was little change to the 
packet headers. In a production environment, the packet headers may change because 
additional network devices are used, such as firewalls and routers.   
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Another aspect that limited our research was declining the usage of PySMB14, 
which is an experimental SMB/CIFS (Common Internet File System). We opted to 
simulate user behavior through our script and not introduce another capability such as 
PySMB that we were unfamiliar with regarding how it interacted with the host and 
network.  
We also did not select network traffic generators such as Smartbear, AutoIT, and 
Sikuli. These applications can accept and record user actions on a host and simulate 
network traffic. We chose not to use these because we did not fully understand what was 
occurring “under the hood” or its effect on the network.  
Finally, we also chose not to use packet carvers15. Opting to select a packet carver 
and manipulate network traffic would not lend credence to establishing the ground truth by 
working the dependent variables within our research. Packet carvers may still be an asset 
in future research methods. For example, is it possible to carve a packet to resemble an 
SMB download command? Can ML determine the difference between an authenticate 
SMB packet compared to a carved SMB packet?  
1. Limitations with the Classification Model with Encryption  
The DoDIN uses numerous IDS/IPS solutions and encryption methods that change 
some of the packet headers' information. Some solutions use a brokerage method to break 
the encryption chain and inspect network traffic. The effects of the brokerage can alter the 
information in the packet headers after it is re-encrypted. Baselining the network with 
devices that broker network connections may still allow for ML to determine classification.  
Furthermore, the security appliances that the DoDIN uses when access resources 
that are geographically separated. These packets will go through multiple network security 
devices and require a robust effort to achieve a baseline.  
 
14 More information about PySMB can be found at https://pypi.org/project/pysmb/. 
15 Packet carvers are applications that allows a user to adjust and make modifications to network 
packets to create a desired effect. Typically, this done to test network appliances for network attacks such 
as observing a Tear Drop attack. 
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This leads to another dimension to consider when carrying on this research further. 
Observing SMB version 3 (SMB3) uses end-to-end encryption to protect the payload's 
confidentiality, but not the TCP headers. The encryption prevents reading the SMB 
commands in the PCAP. In SMB2 traffic, we observed the various SMB commands used. 
For instance, the Read, Write, IOTCL, GetInfo, Find, etc., are present in the PCAP. SMB3 
encrypts the network traffic, and the SMB commands are no longer visible; therefore, 
leveraging supervised learning was not achievable for the targets that we were observing.  
2. Classification usage in an Enterprise Environment 
ML can use PCAPs from enterprise file-sharing solutions to provide classifications 
as well. For instance, cloud storage applications like Google Drive, Dropbox, and 
Microsoft SharePoint can provide classifications from their PCAPs. These services may or 
may not use the SMB protocol; however, it is possible to understand what primary file 
operations are being used by observing targets in a classification model such as uploading 
and downloading files.  
Connecting to these services may occur over Transport Layer Security (TLS) when 
using port 443 (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure, or HTTPS) when using web browsers. 
As discussed earlier, TLS uses encryption to protect the confidentiality of the payload.  
Google Drive and Dropbox can also be installed on local machines as applications 
to allow users to upload and download documents from their desktop. Some users may use 
this method to circumvent the security policies that prevent accessing private file-sharing 
sites. These applications may perform differently from SMB and web-based applications, 
but they provide another aspect to consider when observing file-sharing behavior on the 
network.  
Data security is the focal point for the DOD. The DOD heavily relies upon file-
sharing capabilities like SharePoint when it comes to data sharing and file collaboration. 
Observing SharePoint activity and correlating that with PCAPs could increase security 
awareness for malicious behavior. For example, a disgruntled user downloading numerous 
documents can aggregate the documents' overall classification, potentially putting national 
security at risk. 
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Cybersecurity professionals would cheerfully accept ML as a new tool to predict 
malicious behavior before the incident occurs. Combing through security logs and 
conducting deep packet inspection is tedious. Still, leveraging ML would alleviate a severe 
amount of work effort to allow these individuals to maintain focus on defending the 
network.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Our research using ML to observe and predict SMB operations was exciting to 
conduct and watch. The DOD can significantly enhance any network operations center and 
provide additional coverage for security managers to achieve rapid incident handling and 
response. More importantly, the time it takes to perform deep packet inspection may not 
have to occur as often with manual labor as when using ML.  
As the DOD moves forward and continues to develop Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning (AIML) techniques and procedures, this capability will continue to 
expand further and provide invaluable services. More importantly, seeing the adoption of 
ML in the Cyber Mission Force16 will significantly enhance the United States' posture in 
the Cyber domain for many years to come. The DOD should continue to invest in training 
and produce cyber warriors with technical skills and education that will exploit the usage 
of ML to defend the DoDIN and U.S. national interest at home and abroad.  
 
16 The Cyber Mission Force is the U.S. Cyber Command’s operational arm that performs offensive and 
defensive operations and activities in and through cyberspace.  
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APPENDIX. SOURCE CODES 
A. SMB GENERATIONS 
import os, psutil, random, shutil, csv 
from smb.SMBHandler import SMBHandler 
from random import randint 
from time import sleep, time 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#appendgarbage function is just to call when a file needs to have  
#garbage padded to it for it to increase in size  
def appendgarbage(): 
 padchar = 
("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789") 
 
 return padchar 
 
#lastfileaction function is used to determine the last action on a file.  
# "A" - Last time file was accessed/read 
# "M" - Last time file was modified 
# "C" - Last time meta data was changed on file (Linux), or 
# "C" - The creation time of the file (Microsoft) 
#Note, if the creation time is greater than the accessed time, it possibly means 
#that the file was copied from another location and then pasted in which it would 
#get a new time creation stamp. 
def lastfileaction(mystat): 
 if mystat.st_atime >= mystat.st_ctime and mystat.st_atime >= mystat.st_mtime: 
     LastFileStatus = "A" 
 elif mystat.st_mtime >= mystat.st_ctime and mystat.st_mtime >= mystat.st_atime: 
     LastFileStatus = "M" 
 elif mystat.st_ctime >= mystat.st_atime and mystat.st_ctime >= mystat.st_mtime: 
     LastFileStatus = "C" 
 else: 
     LastFileStatus = "NOOP"       
 return LastFileStatus 
 
#timeopen function captures the current time when called  
#for operations that are opened 
def timeopen(): 
 timenow = datetime.now() 
 currenttime = timenow.strftime("%H:%M:%S") 
 return currenttime 
 
72 
#timeclosed function captures the current time when called  
#for operation to close out 
def timeclose(): 
 timenow = datetime.now() 
 currenttime = timenow.strftime("%H:%M:%S") 
 return currenttime 
 
def closefile(): 
 #try closing randomFile after being opened 
 try:                
         #kill MS applications that are opened after the timer expires 
     for process in (process for process in psutil.process_iter()): 
         if process.name()=="WORDPAD.EXE": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="WINWORD.EXE": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="Microsoft.Photos.exe": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="msedge.exe": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="Video.UI.exe": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="POWERPNT.EXE": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="EXCEL.EXE": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="notepad.exe": 
             process.kill() 
         elif process.name()=="AcroRd32.exe": 
             process.kill() 
 #if process does not exist anymore (program quit), then pass              
 except psutil.NoSuchProcess: 
     pass 
     
 return 
#fileopener function random selects an operation (read, open, download, upload & lateral 
copy 
#to simulate user operations on the SMB share drive. 
#mystat.st_ctime is creation time (windows) or meta data change (unix) 
#mystat.st_atime is last time file was read/accessed but not changed 
#mystat.st_mtime is last time file was changed 
#mystat.st_size is Size of the file in bytes, if it is a regular file or a symbolic link. 
#mystat.st_mode is file type and file mode bits (permissions) 
#LastFileStatus shows if file was modified, accessed/read, or created (windows)/meta 
changed (unix) 
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#print(randomFile, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, mystat.st_size, mystat.st_ctime, 
mystat.st_mtime, mystat.st_mtime)    
#APPEND TO CSV FILE 
def fileopener(logFile, StartTime, CloseTime):     
 
 #for loop through specified directory and copy append names of files into list 
 for root, dirs, files in os.walk(r"Y:\Documents\Data", topdown=True): 
     #go through each file   
     for file in files: 
 
         randomFile = os.path.join(root, file) 
             
         #identify the file extension to be used for the next block of code 
         fileType = os.path.splitext(randomFile) 
             
         #random choice determines the type of operation to be conducted 
         randomChoice = [1,2,3,4,5] 
             
         #Read and/or write from SMB share drive. If .txt or .docx, write to file, else 
         #read from file 
         if random.choice(randomChoice) == 1: 
             #if extension is .txt or .docx, it will be padded with garbage data  
             #simulate a user adding data to it.              
             if fileType[-1] == ".txt" or fileType[-1] == ".docx":    
                 #set time now 
                 sysTime = time() 
                 #random value will determine how much garbage data is written to file 
                 randomLimit = random.randrange(50,500) 
                 xCount = 0 
                 #while loop will call function to append garbage data, then close 
                 while xCount <= randomLimit: 
                     addchar = appendgarbage() 
                     updateFile = open(randomFile, 'a') 
                     updateFile.write (addchar) 
                     updateFile.write ("\n") 
                     xCount += 1 
                 updateFile.close() 
                 #open file through its native application and record action 
                 fileAction = "Write" 
                 os.startfile(randomFile)  
             else: 
                 fileAction = "Read" 
                 #set time now and open file to read 
                 sysTime = time()                     
                 os.startfile(randomFile) 
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             #get file status after data has been read/written to  
             mystat = os.stat(randomFile)     
                 
             #return last action on that file (R accessed, M modified, C created) 
             LastFileStatus = lastfileaction(mystat)                   
         
             #time set to leave application open for random sleep timer 
             sleep(randint(StartTime, CloseTime)) 
             #print results to csv file 
             with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 
                 filewriter = csv.writer(csvfile, 
delimiter=",",quotechar='|',quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)  
                 
filewriter.writerow([randomFile,sysTime,fileAction,LastFileStatus,mystat.st_mode,mysta
t.st_size, \ 
                                      mystat.st_ctime,mystat.st_atime,mystat.st_mtime]) 
             #print results to terminal 
             print(randomFile, sysTime, fileAction, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, 
mystat.st_size,mystat.st_ctime, \ 
                   mystat.st_atime, mystat.st_mtime)                 
             #close csv file 
             closefile() 
                 
         #read operation - open file from SMB share drive   
         elif random.choice(randomChoice) == 2: 
             sysTime = time() 
             os.startfile(randomFile) 
             fileAction = "Read"     
           
             #get file status after data has been written to it 
             mystat = os.stat(randomFile)   
                 
             #return last action on that file (R accessed, M modified, C created) 
             LastFileStatus = lastfileaction(mystat)                   
         
             #time set to leave Word open for 7 to 20 seconds 
             sleep(randint(StartTime, CloseTime)) 
             #write results to csv file 
             with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 
                 filewriter = csv.writer(csvfile, 
delimiter=",",quotechar='|',quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)  
                 
filewriter.writerow([randomFile,sysTime,fileAction,LastFileStatus,mystat.st_mode,mysta
t.st_size, \ 
                                      mystat.st_ctime,mystat.st_atime,mystat.st_mtime]) 
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             #print results to terminal 
             print(randomFile, sysTime, fileAction, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, 
mystat.st_size,mystat.st_ctime, \ 
                   mystat.st_atime, mystat.st_mtime)                 
             #close csv file 
             closefile() 
              
         #Later copy operation, move one file from SMB share drive location to another on 
SMB share drive    
         elif random.choice(randomChoice) == 3:  
             sysTime = time()                 
             shutil.copy2(randomFile,r'Y:\Documents\Upload') 
             fileAction = "Lateral Copy"             
 
             #pull os.stat on randomFile after processing 
             mystat = os.stat(randomFile)  
     
             #return last action on that file (R accessed, M modified, C created) 
             LastFileStatus = lastfileaction(mystat)     
                 
             #write results to csv file 
             with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 
                 filewriter = csv.writer(csvfile, 
delimiter=",",quotechar='|',quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)  
                 
filewriter.writerow([randomFile,sysTime,fileAction,LastFileStatus,mystat.st_mode,mysta
t.st_size, \ 
                                      mystat.st_ctime,mystat.st_atime,mystat.st_mtime]) 
             #print results to terminal 
             print(randomFile, sysTime, fileAction, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, 
mystat.st_size,mystat.st_ctime, \ 
                   mystat.st_atime, mystat.st_mtime)    
             
         #Download operation - download file from SMB share drive to local drive and get 
system time 
         elif random.choice(randomChoice) == 4:  
             sysTime = time()                 
             shutil.copy2(randomFile,r'C:\Temp') 
             fileAction = "Download"             
 
             #pull os.stat on randomFile after processing 
             mystat = os.stat(randomFile)  
     
             #return last action on that file (R accessed, M modified, C created) 
             LastFileStatus = lastfileaction(mystat)     
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             #write results to csv file 
             with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 
                 filewriter = csv.writer(csvfile, 
delimiter=",",quotechar='|',quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)  
                 
filewriter.writerow([randomFile,sysTime,fileAction,LastFileStatus,mystat.st_mode,mysta
t.st_size, \ 
                                      mystat.st_ctime,mystat.st_atime,mystat.st_mtime]) 
             #print results to terminal 
             print(randomFile, sysTime, fileAction, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, 
mystat.st_size,mystat.st_ctime, \ 
                   mystat.st_atime, mystat.st_mtime)  
             
         #Upload operation - upload file from local drive to SMB share drive 
         elif random.choice(randomChoice) == 5:  
             localFile = random.choice(os.listdir(r'C:\Temp')) 
             #pull os.stat on randomFile after processing 
             mystat = os.stat(randomFile) 
                 
             #copy from local drive to SMB share drive and get system time 
             sysTime = time()                 
             shutil.copy2(os.path.join(r'C:\Temp', localFile),r'Y:\Documents\Upload') 
             fileAction = "Upload"                                            
 
     
             #return last action on that file (R accessed, M modified, C created) 
             LastFileStatus = lastfileaction(mystat)     
                 
             #write results to csv file 
             with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 
                 filewriter = csv.writer(csvfile, 
delimiter=",",quotechar='|',quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)  
                 
filewriter.writerow([randomFile,sysTime,fileAction,LastFileStatus,mystat.st_mode,mysta
t.st_size, \ 
                                      mystat.st_ctime,mystat.st_atime,mystat.st_mtime]) 
             #print results to terminal 
             print(randomFile, sysTime, fileAction, LastFileStatus, mystat.st_mode, 
mystat.st_size,mystat.st_ctime, \ 
                   mystat.st_atime, mystat.st_mtime)                  
 
     #time set to delay parent loop for 10 to 15 seconds to buffer out processing time   








#get input log file name from user 
logFile = str(input("Enter name of CSV log file to output to (e.g. save.csv): ")) 
 
#get start and close sleep time from user that determines how long an application stays 
open 
print("Configure random time range in seconds...> ") 
StartTime = int(input("Enter the start time of sleep: ")) 
CloseTime = int(input("Enter the stop time for sleep: ")) 
 
while StartTime >= CloseTime: 
 print("Incorrect time range... ") 
 StartTime = int(input("Please enter correct start sleep time: ")) 






#CREATE AND APPEND TO CSV FILE 
with open(logFile, 'a', newline='') as csvfile: 






#pass in arguments and call function to process file opener                                 













































 dfs = [] 
 for f in glob.glob('features/*.csv'): 
     df = pd.read_csv(f) 
     df['behavior'] = os.path.split(f)[1].split('_')[0] 
     dfs.append(df) 
 
 df = pd.concat(dfs, ignore_index=True) 
 
 X = df[FEATURES].values 
 y = df[TARGETS].values 
 y_binary = (y > 0).astype(int) 
 behaviors = df['behavior'].values 
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 X_train, X_test, y_train_binary, y_test_binary, behavior_train, behavior_test = 
train_test_split(X, y_binary, behaviors, train_size=0.5, random_state=seed) 
 clf = RandomForestClassifier(n_estimators=100, random_state=seed) 
 clf.fit(X_train, y_train_binary) 
 y_pred_binary = clf.predict(X_test) 
 




 with open('reports/overall_report.txt', 'w') as f: 
     f.write(report) 
 
 for behavior in np.unique(behavior_test): 
     idx = (behavior_test == behavior) 
     X_test_behavior = X_test[idx] 
     y_test_behavior = y_test_binary[idx] 
     y_pred_behavior = clf.predict(X_test_behavior) 
 
     report = classification_report(y_test_behavior, y_pred_behavior, digits=3, 
target_names=TARGETS) 
     print(report) 
 
     with open('reports/%s_report.txt' % behavior, 'w') as f: 
         f.write(report) 
 
     freqs = y_pred_behavior.sum(axis=0) 
     fig, ax = plt.subplots(1,1, figsize=(4,4)) 
     ar = np.arange(len(TARGETS)) 
     ax.bar(ar, freqs) 
     ax.set_xticks(ar) 
     ax.set_xticklabels(TARGETS) 
     ax.set_xlabel('SMB Command') 
     ax.set_ylabel('Frequency') 
     plt.savefig('figures/%s_hist.pdf' % behavior) 
 
 











import pandas as pd 
 
WINDOW_SIZE = 30 
 
def window_features(df): 
 begin = df.iloc[0]['Time'] 
 end = df.iloc[-1]['Time'] 
 
 smbread = 'Read' 
 smbwrite = 'Write' 
 smbtreecon = 'Tree Connect' 
 smbsessionsetup = 'Session Setup' 
 smbsessionlogoff = 'Session Logoff' 
 smbcreate = 'Create' 
 smbgetinfo = 'GetInfo' 
 smbgetinfo2 = 'GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 smbgetinfo3 = 'GetInfo,GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 smbfind = 'Find' 
 smbfindfind = 'Find,Find' 
 smbcreatesetinfo = 'Create,SetInfo' 
 createioctl = 'Create,Ioctl' 
 creategetinfo ='Create,GetInfo' 
 creategetinfo2 ='Create,GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 createfind2 = 'Create,Find,Find' 
 smbclose = 'Close' 
 noop = ' ' 
 
 
 f = { 
     #'Time_mean':df['Time'].mean(), 
     #'Time_std':df['Time'].std(), 
     'Delta_Time_Mean': df['DeltaTime'].mean(), 
     'Delta_Time_Std': df['DeltaTime'].std(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Cap_Frame_Mean': df['TimeDelta_prev_cap_frame'].mean(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Cap_Frame_Std': df['TimeDelta_prev_cap_frame'].std(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Disp_Frame_mean': 
df['TimeDelta_prev_displayed_frame'].mean(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Disp_Frame_std': df['TimeDelta_prev_displayed_frame'].std(), 
     'Window_Size_Mean': df['Window'].mean(), 
     'Window_Size_Std': df['Window'].std(), 
     'Packet_Length_Mean': df['Packet Len'].mean(), 
     'Packet_Length_Std': df['Packet Len'].std(), 
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     'TCP_Len_Mean': df['TCP Len'].mean(), 
     'TCP_Len_Std': df['TCP Len'].std(), 
     'Session_Setup': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbsessionsetup).sum(), 
     'Session_Logoff': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbsessionlogoff).sum(), 
     'Tree_Connect': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbtreecon).sum(), 
     'GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo).sum(), 
     'GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo2).sum(), 
     'GetInfo_GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo3).sum(), 
     'Create': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbcreate).sum(), 
     'Read': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbread).sum(), 
     'Write': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbwrite).sum(), 
     'Close': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbclose).sum(), 
     'Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbfind).sum(), 
     'Find_Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbfindfind).sum(), 
     'Create_SetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbcreatesetinfo).sum(), 
     'Create_Ioctl': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(createioctl).sum(), 
     'Create_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(creategetinfo).sum(), 
     'Create_GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(creategetinfo2).sum(), 
     'Create_Find_Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(createfind2).sum(), 
     'No_Op': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(noop).sum(), 
 
 
     #look for rows that fall between beginning and end of window 
     #add #of file reads, writes, etc. columns (one column for #write) 
     #ensure the time units in the csv are the same in the log file**** 
 } 
 return f 
 
 
def main(fname_in, fname_out): 
 df = pd.read_csv(fname_in, index_col=0) 
 
 # upstream = df[df['Dst Port']==445] 
 # downstream = df[df['Src Port']==445] 
 
 features = [] 
 for i in range(0, len(df)-WINDOW_SIZE, WINDOW_SIZE): 
     features.append(window_features(df.iloc[i:(i+WINDOW_SIZE)])) 
 
 features = pd.DataFrame(features) 






if __name__ == '__main__': 
 main('2019MassiveDelete.csv', '2019MassiveDelete_features.csv') 
 main('2019MassiveDownload.csv', '2019MassiveDownload_features.csv') 
 main('2019MassiveLateralCopy.csv', '2019MassiveLateralCopy_features.csv') 
 main('2019MassiveUpload.csv', '2019MassiveUpload_features.csv') 
 
FE EXTRACTION SMB COUNT 
import os 
import sys 
import pandas as pd 
 
#df = pd.read_csv (r"23NOV5_15pcap.csv") 
#pd.options.display.max_columns = None 
#print(df) 
 
WINDOW_SIZE = 100 
 
def window_features(df): 
 begin = df.iloc[0]['Time'] 
 end = df.iloc[-1]['Time'] 
     
 smbread = 'Read' 
 smbwrite = 'Write' 
 smbtreecon = 'Tree Connect' 
 smbsessionsetup = 'Session Setup' 
 smbsessionlogoff = 'Session Logoff' 
 smbcreate = 'Create' 
 smbgetinfo = 'GetInfo' 
 smbgetinfo2 = 'GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 smbgetinfo3 = 'GetInfo,GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 smbfind = 'Find' 
 smbfindfind = 'Find,Find' 
 smbcreatesetinfo = 'Create,SetInfo' 
 createioctl = 'Create,Ioctl' 
 creategetinfo ='Create,GetInfo'     
 creategetinfo2 ='Create,GetInfo,GetInfo' 
 createfind2 = 'Create,Find,Find' 
 smbclose = 'Close' 
 noop = ' ' 
     
     
 f = { 
     #'Time_mean':df['Time'].mean(), 
     #'Time_std':df['Time'].std(), 
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     'Delta_Time_Mean': df['DeltaTime'].mean(), 
     'Delta_Time_Std': df['DeltaTime'].std(),          
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Cap_Frame_Mean': df['TimeDelta_prev_cap_frame'].mean(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Cap_Frame_Std': df['TimeDelta_prev_cap_frame'].std(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Disp_Frame_mean': 
df['TimeDelta_prev_displayed_frame'].mean(), 
     'Time_Delta_Prev_Disp_Frame_std': df['TimeDelta_prev_displayed_frame'].std(), 
     'Window_Size_Mean': df['Window'].mean(), 
     'Window_Size_Std': df['Window'].std(),          
     'Packet_Length_Mean': df['Packet Len'].mean(), 
     'Packet_Length_Std': df['Packet Len'].std(), 
     'TCP_Len_Mean': df['TCP Len'].mean(), 
     'TCP_Len_Std': df['TCP Len'].std(), 
     'Session_Setup': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbsessionsetup).sum(),  
     'Session_Logoff': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbsessionlogoff).sum(),         
     'Tree_Connect': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbtreecon).sum(),     
     'GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo).sum(),   
     'GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo2).sum(),   
     'GetInfo_GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbgetinfo3).sum(),   
     'Create': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbcreate).sum(), 
     'Read': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbread).sum(), 
     'Write': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbwrite).sum(), 
     'Close': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbclose).sum(), 
     'Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbfind).sum(),         
     'Find_Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbfindfind).sum(), 
     'Create_SetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(smbcreatesetinfo).sum(), 
     'Create_Ioctl': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(createioctl).sum(), 
     'Create_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(creategetinfo).sum(),         
     'Create_GetInfo_GetInfo': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(creategetinfo2).sum(), 
     'Create_Find_Find': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(createfind2).sum(), 
     'No_Op': df['SMB CMD'].str.count(noop).sum(), 
         
         
     #look for rows that fall between beginning and end of window 
     #add #of file reads, writes, etc. columns (one column for #write)   
     #ensure the time units in the csv are the same in the log file**** 
 } 
 print(f) 
 return f 
 
 
def main(fname_in, fname_out): 
 df = pd.read_csv(fname_in, index_col=0) 
 
 # upstream = df[df['Dst Port']==445] 
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 # downstream = df[df['Src Port']==445] 
 
 features = [] 
 for i in range(len(df)-WINDOW_SIZE): 
     features.append(window_features(df.iloc[i:(i+WINDOW_SIZE)])) 
 
 features = pd.DataFrame(features) 





if __name__ == '__main__': 
 # usage: $ python extract_features.py <input> <output> 
     
 fname_in = sys.argv[1] 
 fname_out = sys.argv[2] 
""" 
 
fname_in = str(input("enter csv file: ")) 
 
fname_out = str(input("enter output file: ")) 
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